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Summary 
The ECCC is positioned within a hybrid democratic system where politics affect law, and 
where law does not stand in the way of money and power. This culture follows the 
Cambodian judges into the ECCC, where it is translated into their practices. The ECCC being 
a mixed tribunal has both Cambodian and international judges. Allegations of corruption, 
political interference and kickbacks have circled the Cambodian judges since the opening. 
This hybrid system, where democratic rules have been adopted but not necessarily practiced, 
is controlled by the country‘s long tradition of patronage politics, corruption and impunity 
where money, power and political favors have enabled the bypassing of the rule of law. The 
legislature and judiciary is weak. The ruling party is influencing the laws being made and the 
judges by bribery and extortion etc. This due to decades of a weak legal system, after the 
Khmer Rouge wiped out all legal and moral norms, and killed almost the entire legal 
profession. Today‘s legal system was introduced by the international community in 
accordance with international standards of justice and does consequently not reflect 
Cambodian practices. An analysis of research and reports regarding this situation shows that 
Cambodian laws are not in a strong enough state of being the primary base of the tribunal‘s 
jurisdiction and procedure. Politically active figures hold positions in institutions that are 
supposedly independent and neutral. Hun Sen has made statements seemingly as an attempt to 
affect the ECCC practices. Disagreements between the Cambodian and international staff 
have lead to a delay of the process. Conclusively, there is a tendency of the Cambodian judges 
in the ECCC taking a stance along line the Cambodian politics, while the international judges 
have taken the opposite. Ergo, this is a sign that the ECCC is not solely independent and 
neutral. Politics seem indeed to be coming in contact with its practices, and influence cannot 
yet be excluded.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Scope and Goals  
This thesis will examine the effects that Cambodia‘s hybrid democratic system might have on 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and its practices. First, it will 
look into the structure of the country‘s political system, the traditional norms and values that 
compose it and the actors that sustain it. Secondly, it will scrutinize Cambodia‘s legal system 
and examine the role of politics in this legal environment. The ultimate focus is on the ECCC 
and its practices and whether they are affected by these political and legal circumstances that 
uphold the Cambodian system in which the ECCC is situated. Thus, the connection between 
hybridity and the ECCC will be studied, where issues such as patronage, corruption, political 
interference and international standards of justice will be discussed.  
Since the negotiations for the tribunal started, it has been questioned whether a 
tribunal within the Cambodian system will be able to meet international standards of justice. 
The Cambodian legal system is said to be highly politically interfered with and corrupt. These 
allegations have surrounded the ECCC since its opening and they are still a pressing issue. 
Because the ECCC is a mixed court with both national and international staff, political 
influence might be a more realistic possibility than otherwise in international tribunals. A 
major issue is allegations of Cambodian staff in the ECCC being politically influenced in the 
favor of the ruling party Cambodian People‘s Party, CPP, and judges being corrupt. Prime 
Minister Hun Sen‘s public statements about e.g. the number of defendants in the tribunal have 
enhanced the notion of him trying to interfere with the process. This thesis will inspect the 
basis for these allegations, their connection to Cambodia‘s hybrid system and what impact 
this might have on Cambodia‘s society. The goal is to broaden the understanding of how an 
international tribunal is affected by being within the structure of a post-conflict society which 
has not yet developed into a fully functioning democracy, and what impacts this in turn has on 
its society. The questions for this thesis are thus: 
 What is the structure of Cambodia‘s political system? 
 What is the structure of Cambodia‘s legal system and what place do politics have 
in it? 
 What is the structure of the ECCC, and how does the hybrid nature of the 
Cambodian democratic system affect the tribunal and its practices?  
6 
 
This thesis will not focus on the specific cases that are before the ECCC, nor the crimes that 
will be adjudicated. It takes no stand on whether the defendants are guilty or not.  
 
1.2 Applied Methods and Theory 
The method that will be applied in this thesis is an examination of previous research about the 
Khmer Rouge, Cambodia‘s legal and political system, the ECCC and the international 
community‘s reactions and reports. The approach will be an inter-disciplinary connection 
between law, politics and society.  
The ECCC, its practices and potential influences should not be interpreted without an 
understanding of Cambodia‘s legal system. And Cambodia‘s legal system cannot be 
understood without taking into account the historical and political setting. The presentation of 
history and politics serve both as a deeper comprehension of the Cambodian society and legal 
culture, a tool for understanding today‘s practices but also as a basis for discussing possible 
consequences in the ECCC. 
Consequently, the research is systematized and presented in its contextual setting, tying 
together political and legal development, social change, history, tradition, economic factors 
and international influences. Hence, the thesis does not rest on the traditional legal dogmatic 
method and its technicalities, seeing as the objective is not specific legal documents, cases or 
rules. The focus is on the ECCC setting in a broader perspective taking into account possible 
variables of influence. However, the legal doctrine is of great importance in this thesis as well 
as historical research. Doctrine, historical literature, legal documents, articles, web pages, 
political and legal theories will be used as tools. Naturally, one must also realize that the 
application of one theory or more means the exclusion of other. Different theories can explain 
different kinds of actions of a state and within a state depending on the starting-point. 
Depending on what view one takes, such as legal, political, societal or international, many 
theories can be relevant. Due to the constraints of length and space in this thesis, it would not 
do the vast number of theories that apply to the subject matter justice to be addressed shortly 
in this paper. For this reason I have chosen to only focus on the theories that I will apply, 
which will be explained later on. My research will be interpreted and analyzed into answers to 
the questions put forth in this thesis.  
 
1.3 Disposition of the Thesis 
First, a historical background to today‘s Cambodia is presented in Chapter Two. Chapter 
Three presents the Cambodian political system, its development and its consequences. This is 
7 
 
then analyzed in Chapter Four through three approaches: a conservative, a societal, cultural 
and traditional as well as an economic. This gives the basis for Chapter Five which focuses on 
Cambodia‘s legal system, the development to this date and the influences involved.  Chapter 
Six is the main focus of the thesis, which explains what events lead up to the development of 
the ECCC, gives the background to the negotiations on the tribunal and the results of them, it 
sets the tribunal in the Cambodian legal and political setting and presents critiques and 
potential problems along with hopes and expectations. Chapter Seven then analyzes the legal 
development and its effects on the ECCC through three approaches: international relations 
constructivism, social constructivism and sociology of law. The thesis ends with Chapter 
Eight and my concluding remarks.  
 
2. Historical and Political Background to Today‘s Cambodia 
 
For a long time, Cambodia was not an independent country. It was under French colonial rule 
from 1863 until 1953 when King Sihanouk succeeded in achieving independence through 
peaceful methods.
1
 Although the French made Sihanouk king of Cambodia in 1941, he was 
not the one exercising effective control over the country. But Sihanouk was determined to 
achieve independence. The 1945 declaration of independence made the French tighten their 
control by abolishing Cambodian street names and holidays and restored the French ones,
2
 but 
their grip would loosen a few years later, and Sihanouk would finally succeed.
3
  
He started off with a peaceful coup against his own government to remove the 
democrats, which were the leading political party, from the cabinet. He then started governing 
the country even though he never got official mandate for it.
4
 In 1953 the French rule 
collapsed; the war in Vietnam was not going well for them and the increasing fighting in 
Cambodia was not making it better. Although the French kept the economic power over the 
kingdom, Sihanouk was now granted efficient control over Cambodia.
5
 His next step was to 
abdicate the royal throne and designate it to his father. He then created his own conservative 
political party, the Sangkum, and after winning the elections in 1955 he began ruling the 
                                                          
1
 Brott mot mänskligheten under kommunistiska regimer, p. 72 (my translation) 
2
 Chandler, p. 211 
3
 Op. cit., p. 216 
4
 Ibid., p. 225 
5
 Ibid., p. 227 
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country as Cambodia‘s prime minister. He continued to rule the country after the death of his 
father, titled as Prince Sihanouk.
6
  
In the 1960s, Sihanouk worked hard to keep Cambodia outside of the Vietnam War, in 
which he succeeded.
7
 But a series of negative decisions lead to a weakening of his rule and 
strengthening the Communists. He alienated himself with the U.S and South Vietnamese,
8
 a 
decision supported by the Chinese which were Sihanouk‘s big patrons. He secretly let the 
North Vietnamese use Cambodian territory in the Vietnam War.
9
 The cut off from the U.S. 
meant the end to diplomatic relations and economic aid. This was a poor decision since this 
aid contributed to Sihanouk‘s military forces‘ pay and 15 percent subvention of the national 
budget. He thereafter nationalized the foreign trade, which lead to losses of revenue since the 
commercial elite now secretly was trading with the Communists in Vietnam. A lower pay also 
lowered the military‘s morale, rendering his force weaker. The economy kept getting worse as 
Sihanouk was ignoring agricultural problems and mismanaging the state-controlled industry.
10
 
This poor situation, alongside with the Communists‘ success in Vietnam made the 
Communists in Cambodia grow stronger.
11
 
In 1968, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) declared armed struggle against 
Sihanouk‘s government,12 after which Saloth Sar, Pol Pot‘s birth name, and his followers 
withdrew to the jungles in northeastern Cambodia. Sar had gained confidence after a visit to 
China where the Cultural Revolution had inspired him and he found new patrons in the 
radical Chinese. He established the CPK‘s headquarters in the jungles and started taking over 
the surrounding areas, going from village to village and primarily killing the local leaders and 
appointing their own.
13
 One of their ―new‖ strategies was to use children as soldiers, who 
could be shaped into performing any task. And so, this is how the Khmer Rouge started 
developing their revolutionary organization, planning and preparing for a taking of 
Cambodia.
14
 However, in 1970 with the coup d‘état, they were beaten to it and the country 
was taken over by other opponents to Sihanouk; his own cabinet.
15
  
                                                          
6
 Brott mot mänskligheten under kommunistiska regimer, p. 72 (my translation) 
7
 Chandler, p. 242 
8
 Op cit., p. 235-36 
9
 Ibid., p. 237 
10
 Ibid., p. 244-46 
11
 Supra at note 6. 
12
 Etcheson p. 3 
13
 Chandler p. 247, Etcheson p. 5 
14
 Etcheson p. 6 
15
 Chandler p. 248-50 
9 
 
The collapse came after prince Sihanouk went on a trip to France, leaving the country 
to the prime minister Lon Nol and his deputy prime minister prince Sisowath Sirik Matak 
(Sihanouk‘s cousin).16 While Sihanouk was gone, the pro-Western Matak and three army 
officers made Lon Nol sign a vote against the Prince. With that vote, the National Assembly 
voted down Sihanouk and removed their confidence from him. Matak had not been a 
supporter of Sihanouk‘s policies for some time due to the mismanagement of the economy, 
the alienation from the U.S and the presence of the Vietnamese bases on Cambodian soil.
17
 
The new government immediately turned against the Vietnamese and gave an order of 
evacuation. This brought with it enormous changes in the strategic landscape of Cambodia; 
PRC, USSR and the North Vietnamese did not only turn against the new government now, 
but also started assisting the Khmer Rouge. However, the U.S. were supporters of Lon Nol; 
America was at war with Vietnam, and Cambodia alienating themselves with all Vietnamese 
suited them well. Lon Nol‘s Khmer Republic could therefore survive for four years with the 
help from the U.S. which provided economic assistance,
18
  and bombing to protect the regime 
from the growing Communist forces.
19
 
This bombing was called Operation Menu and was supposed to be a bombing of the 
areas bordering to Vietnam. However, the targets were many times indiscriminate, killing up 
to as many as 600,000 civilians. This operation has been widely condemned by the rest of the 
world, with many people seeing it as an American war crime. Ultimately, many people 
believe that this operation was one of the reasons that the Khmer Rouge could gain power 
over Cambodia. This drove Cambodians in distress, which the Communist forces could 
benefit from since the people were more easily recruited to the Khmer Rouge.
20
 
After Lon Nol took over, the Khmer Rouge did not give up the quest for Cambodia 
and nor did Sihanouk who was now in exile in Beijing. He formed an alliance with China, 
North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
21
 He created the National 
United Front for Kampuchea, FUNK, and declared war against those who had overthrown 
him. Sihanouk was however just an instrument for the Khmer Rouge, which used FUNK to 
gather recruits for their own plans. Sihanouk, being in China, could not exercise any efficient 
control in Cambodia. Eventually the Khmer Rouge started cleaning up within FUNK, killing 
                                                          
16
 Gottesman, p. 22 
17
 Chandler, p. 248 
18
 Op.cit., p. 252 
19
 Kiernan and Owen, available at: http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf 23 
November 2009 
20
 Op. cit. 
21
 Supra at note 16. 
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Sihanouk‘s supporters, ethnic Vietnamese and even their own allies if suspected of 
disloyalty.
22
  
Meanwhile, from 1971-1975, the Khmer Republic experienced violent years without a 
strong leadership. The war and the sudden aid from the U.S. worsened life in Phnom Penh. It 
corrupted generals, officials, medicine and other relevant parts of the societal sectors that 
were connected to the economy of war.
23
 The U.S. managed to postpone a Communist victory 
by bombing the surrounding areas of Phnom Penh in 1973,
24
 but ordinary people were 
terrified by the bombings and it drove them into the arms of the Khmer Rouge. It also lead to 
a lack of farmland, which together with the Khmer Rouge uprising resulted in driving more 
than 750,000 rural Cambodians into the cities, a majority of them to Phnom Penh.
25
 
Additionally, the Khmer Rouge had already assumed mass murder as a strategy, now using it 
where serving their agenda.
26
 Collectivization and compulsory cooperatives were established 
in some areas that they controlled. Even though the people heard about this in Phnom Penh, 
they dismissed it as propaganda thinking that the Khmer Rouge was under Vietnamese 
control. They would be proved wrong.  
In 1975 the Communists started starving Phnom Penh; they cut off shipments of rice 
and ammunition by mining the riverside. The U.S. tried providing aid and ammunition by air, 
but it was not enough to feed the people or defend them. The city was full of millions of 
refugees. Lon Nol fled the country. The U.S. tried to negotiate with Sihanouk but without 
success.
27
 Cambodians that were wealthy enough managed to flee, as did the American 
embassy personnel. The city life was now falling apart with people begging on the streets, 
refugee camps raging with diseases, the social services being nonfunctional and the 
administration being ruled by corruption.  
This made students believe in the revolution and therefore join the Khmer Rouge, 
which were getting stronger and stronger.
28
 When the insurgency got so strong, and rockets 
                                                          
22
 Etcheson, p. 6-7 
23
 Supra at note 16. 
24
 Supra at note 19. ―The last phase of the bombing, from February to August 1973, was designed to stop the 
Khmer Rouge‘s advance on the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh. The United States, fearing that the first 
Southeast Asian domino was about to fall, began a massive escalation of the air war — an unprecedented B-52 
bombardment that focused on the heavily populated area around Phnom Penh but left few regions of the country 
untouched.― 
25
 Gottesman, p. 24 
26
 Chandler, p. 252-253 
27
 Op.cit., p. 254 
28
 Supra at note 25 
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began firing, Lon Nol ordered his troops to surrender. The next day, on April 17
th
 1975, the 
KR succeeded in taking over Phnom Penh. Cambodia was now theirs for the taking.
29
  
Kiernan holds that the atrocities that began on this day in 1975 happened with foreign 
consent. Because of the Cold War politics, it was important for the U.S. to stay on good terms 
with China, and since Mao‘s China was the Khmer Rouge‘s biggest allies, it made way for a 
diplomatic climate wherein Pol Pot could rule Cambodia without interference from the Great 
Powers.
30
   
People were at first not aware of what the revolution meant, but hoped that it would 
bring a change into the horrific life situation that most people now felt in Phnom Penh. This 
would however not be the case.
31
 In Kiernan‘s interviews, witnesses told that the Khmer 
Rouge first concentrated on disarming the Lon Nol soldiers, ordering them to strip down their 
uniforms, wherever they found them. Then the order of evacuation came, and the Khmer 
Rouge soldiers went from house to house making sure that everyone left. The order was to go 
anywhere, just out of the capital.
32
 No exceptions were made and even hospitals were 
emptied. Ergo, many sick and old people died along the way, since no food or medical 
attention was given.
33
 Without highly populated areas, i.e. towns, people were far easier to 
control, since they had nowhere to turn if they wanted to express resistance and demands. And 
with nowhere to gather, communications between citizens were made difficult.
34
  
Executions started with the former regime‘s military officers, top down, thereafter 
their civil servants and finally anyone who was suspected of harboring enemy values or 
dissenting. Education and even eyeglasses was seen as indications of this and could result in 
execution.
35
 The country was divided into two types of people; people from the cities were 
proclaimed as ―new people‖ and people from the rural areas as ―old people‖.36  The 
propaganda that came from the leaders was that the city people were immoral exploiters 
which have had a much easier life than the peasants.
37
 The motto against them was the 
infamous ―to keep you is no gain, to lose you is no loss‖.38  
                                                          
29
 Kiernan, p. 34 
30
 Kiernan (2008), p. 1-2 
31
 Gottesman, p. 25 
32
 Kiernan, p. 35 
33
 Supra at note 31. 
34
 Kiernan, p. 64 
35
 Etcheson,  p. 7 
36
 Brott mot mänskliga rättigheter under kommunistiska regimer, p. 74 (my translation) 
37
 Kiernan, p. 62  
38
 Khamboly, Documentation Centre of Cambodia 2007, available at:  
http://www.dccam.org/Publication/Monographs/Part1-1.pdf 28 November 2009 
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The leaders isolated the country on the international arena as well; the borders were 
closed, foreigners expelled, all means of international communication cut off. At first, there 
was no word of the Khmer Rouge leaders and their ideology. Officially, Sihanouk was the 
head of state and the new leadership was referred to as Angkar, the Organization.
39
 A new 
constitution came in January 1976 and the country was now called Democratic Kampuchea. A 
couple of months later, Pol Pot (still under secret identity), was declared as the prime minister 
and Sihanouk was placed in house arrest. It was not until 1977 that Pol Pot‘s real identity, 
Saloth Sar, was reveled after which he acknowledged the existence of the Communist party 
and their ruling of the country.
40
 
 The policy of Democratic Kampuchea was one of uniformity and all personal goods 
were abolished, as well as all markets and currencies. The constitution meant that ―all 
important means of production‖ would be collectivized and there were no constitutional rights 
except for ―the right to work‖.41 The goal of the new regime was to increase the production of 
rice and thereby increase the export of it, and use those earnings to develop the agriculture 
and industrialize the country.
42
 And so, with the exception of leaders and soldiers, everyone 
had to work every day at least as long as there was daylight, including children. 
Consequently, a lot of people worked themselves to death, especially the ―new people‖ since 
they were not used to that kind of hard bodywork. The housing situation was forced 
collectives, food was distributed by the soldiers, and everyone had to wear the same clothes. 
Families were torn apart and men were commonly separated from women as well as children 
from their parents. The Khmer Rouge organized marriages that they thought fit. Extramarital 
sexual relations were prohibited and could result in death penalties. Children were 
indoctrinated into the Khmer Rouge ideology and forced to spy and report on their parents.
43
  
Despite the hard labor, the crops were not as good as the Khmer Rouge was expecting, 
resulting in diseases caused by malnutrition and death by starvation. The executions were at 
first concentrated on the old regime‘s followers, intellectuals, formerly rich people, minorities 
and anyone who expressed dissent. Then, people would randomly be targeted for execution 
because of some reasons that the soldiers thought they had for suspecting disloyalty. Many 
times, they would make up reasons. And after a while, the leaders had to blame the 
disappointing harvest on someone, and so cleansing within the own Party started and did not 
                                                          
39
 Gottesman, p 25 
40
 Brott mot mänskliga rättigheter under kommunistiska regimer, p. 75 (my translation) 
41
 Gottesman, p. 26 
42
 Supra at note 40. 
43
 Supra at note 41. 
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stop until the regime‘s fall.44 1.7 million People were killed, which at that time was 
approximately 20 per cent of the population.
45
 
The Khmer Rouge‘s killing went beyond Cambodia‘s border as they thought that they 
were at war with their neighbors. Especially suspicious of Vietnam, they terrorized the 
Vietnamese areas around the borders with raids of massacres in Vietnamese villages. This 
went on for years, until Vietnam could not take it anymore and put an end to Democratic 
Kampuchea (DK). On December 25
th
, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge was 
defeated on January 7
th 
1979.
46
  
Vietnam immediately set up a new regime, the People‘s Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK). Some of the former Khmer Rouge cadre that had fled the internal CPK cleansing had 
joined forces with Vietnam and was now part of the new regime. One of them is today‘s 
prime minister Hun Sen. PRK held a trial against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in absentia and 
sentenced them to death, but this was never recognized by the international community.
47
 
Even though the Khmer Rouge was defeated, they kept terrorizing the country from 
camps that they established along the Thai border after their flight and the war between the 
new Vietnamese installed regime PRK and the Khmer Rouge was ongoing during the whole 
Vietnamese occupation.
48
  
Vietnam had its supporters in the international world, as well did the Khmer Rouge. 
Cold war fears and politics played a big part in which sides the international world chose. 
Fear of expansion was a big issue and the balance of power therefore important. Moscow and 
the Eastern Bloc, being far away, got on the PRK‘s side. China and the other ASEAN 
countries, being in the region, were afraid that Vietnam would try to expand through 
Cambodia and therefore got on the Khmer Rouge side. U.S. on the other hand was still 
balancing off power with Soviet, and therefore in temporary alliance with China, resulting in 
an indirect American support of the Khmer Rouge.
49
 The UN Security Council even tried to 
condemn the Vietnamese occupation by a resolution against it, but it was vetoed by Soviet. 
On the other hand, even against the reappeared Sihanouk‘s recommendations, the UN General 
                                                          
44
 Gottesman, p 27-28 and supra at note. 40 
45
 Brott mot mänskliga rättigheter under kommunistiska regimer, p.71 (my translation), See also Kiernan (2008), 
p. 271 that says that the death toll is between 1.671 and 1.871 million  
46
 Etcheson, p. 8 
47
 Linton, p. 40-41 
48
 Supra at note 46. 
49
 Gottesman, p. 43 and Roberts, p. x-xiii 
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Assembly voted on the Cambodian UN seat, and the clear majority chose to grant the seat to 
the exiled government of Democratic Kampuchea.
50
  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was yet again a shift in world politics. For 
the PRK, that meant a much weaker assistance,
51
 causing the Vietnamese forces to leave the 
country in 1989 without any transitional measures to help the remaining PRK regime. The 
four factions in Cambodia now came to a deadlock in the opposition, a situation that alarmed 
the international community, which decided to push for peace between the different parties.
52
 
This pressure led to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 resulting in a transitional 
UN operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC), with 
the goal of establishing peace and democracy in Cambodia. The four factions to the war were 
now arranged under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk and the competition for power was to 
be made peacefully, ending in democratic nationwide elections in 1993. Concurrently the 
Supreme National Court (SNC) was created and vested with sovereignty. These two organs 
succeed in facilitating a safe come back for hundreds of thousands displaced people, they 
established a human rights regime, improved the country‘s infrastructure and made sure that 
there was peace on the ground.
53
 However, nothing was expressed about the Khmer Rouge 
atrocities and responsibility for eventual trials was placed on a future government.
54
 And even 
though the UN intervention in Cambodia is seen as the biggest success so far, it did not 
fundamentally change the situation in Cambodia. The war between the factions still went on 
and the ones with power acted with impunity. UN succeeded in bringing forces together 
against the Khmer Rouge, but could not prevent the Khmer Rouge or the other military forces 
from violating human rights.
55
 UNTAC had no military mandate; it could not enforce the 
decisions they made nor could they impose sanctions if the decisions were not followed. 
Essentially, it was a case of voluntariness to obedience.
56
  
Still, UNTAC succeeded in holding free and fair elections. And even though Khmer 
Rouge threatened to kill anyone who participated in them, it did not stop 90 percent of the 
eligible Cambodian people to register, and 89 percent of those to actually vote.
57
 After the 
1993 elections, Sihanouk‘s United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and 
                                                          
50
 Gottesman, p. 44 
51
 Linton, p. 41 
52
 Supra at note 46. 
53
 Linton, p. 43 
54
 Op.cit., p. 42 
55
 Human Rights Watch, Cambodia at War, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.cambodia953.html 05 September 2009 
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 Findlay, p. 15 
57
 Etcheson, p. 41 
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Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCIMPEC), came out as the winner,
58
 but the second runner up, 
the Cambodian People‘s Party (CPP), who had been the ruling party, refused to give up their 
power.
59
 And after a political mess, a coalition government was created between 
FUNCIMPEC and CPP without one single leader, but with two prime ministers. Prince 
Ranariddh became the first prime minister, representing the royalists and Hun Sen the second, 
representing the CPP. But despite the objectives of the new coalition, it was widely known 
that the CPP ―still had all the power‖.60 After the elections, UNTAC left Cambodia.61 
Hun Sen has been and is one of those leaders hugely important for Cambodia‘s 
governance. He started out as a foreign minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the 
PRK where he set the basis for his politics on a non-communist, non-ideological ground. He 
offered positions to intellectuals, which were usually not communists.
62
 He set out to establish 
a friendly bilateral relationship with Vietnam.
63
 At the same time, the PRK tried to bring back 
the Cambodian culture that the Khmer Rouge completely had dissolved.
64
 He extended his 
influence quickly. He became deputy prime minister in 1982 and by the time he became 
prime minister in 1985, he had already a wide network of people working for him, setting the 
ground for a state administration.
65
  
With the PRK takeover, the 1980s set the conditions for a system of patronage 
politics. A number of former low-level cadres that were working under Hun Sen were not 
loyal and accepted bribes for favors. A number of his personnel were involved in the black 
market.
66
 Because the economy was so poor, many people joined in the party and became 
active politicians for the sake of collecting taxes and bribes, and sharing with their superiors. 
And so the bureaucracy for patronage politics grew. Eventually it grew faster than the party, 
and became a system that worked separately from the Party politics.
67
 This system became 
even stronger towards the end of the 1980s as the PRK was privatizing the state industries. 
They needed quick money for the war that they were trying to win and sell-offs provided 
that.
68
 But these sell-offs, alongside with the uncertainty about the political future, brought 
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with it corruption, especially in the country-side. Land was distributed internally between the 
military and local officials and competing claims about land were solved with more bribes. It 
all got very much out of hand. The Party did not show any interest of putting an end to the 
corruption, neither did the courts.
69
 The Party status itself did not give any money or favors 
back, while patronage applied to every level in the bureaucracy, making its foothold stronger 
than ever.
70
  
In a patronage system there is unsurprisingly no respect, or very little respect for the 
law, which was a big complaint about Hun Sen‘s government before the 1993 elections, 
especially by the Ministry of Justice.
71
 Even the general prosecutor of the Supreme Court 
issued a report on the lawlessness of the regime.
72
 Eventually, the Council of Ministers 
established their own Legislation Office, pitting them against the Ministry of Justice even 
more.
73
 For Hun Sen and his followers, loyalty and the war against resistance
74
 was more 
important than the judicial process.
75
 Patronage politics was and continues to be the tool for 
power.  
Ergo, the Khmer Rouge demolished the Cambodian society with their atrocities and 
politics. But even after the Khmer Rouge left Cambodia‘s political arena, the ghost of their 
evils continued to haunt the Cambodian society, along with other politics having a strong grip 
on the people and their lives.  
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3. The Cambodian Political System  
 
3.1 Cambodia as a Hybrid Regime 
Cambodia is usually referred to as a hybrid democracy. A society that has democratic 
institutions, but at the same time has government officials that use and abuse the rules of 
democracy for the sake of obtaining authoritarian power to the extent that it cannot be seen as 
a de facto democracy, is called a hybrid regime as explained by Levitsky and Way.
76
 
However, it is not the same as full-scale authoritarianism, nor are the typical modern day 
requirements for a democracy met in it. Levitsky and Way identify modern democratic 
regimes based on four basic requirements: ―1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through 
elections that are open, free, and fair; 2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote; 3) 
political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and 
freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected; and 4) elected 
authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control 
of military or clerical leaders.‖ This is not to be confused with flawed democracies where the 
regime might be inefficient and breaking some rules, but that still meet the basic requirements 
for a democracy.
77
  
Cambodia is a democracy in that it has democratic institutions and periodically held 
elections that are seen as sufficiently free and fair.
78
 But as Kheang Un points out, beneath 
these democratic institutions there is a web of institutional strings that the ruling CPP are 
pulling and thus restricting effective political competition in rural Cambodia.
79
 Using 
Levitsky‘s and Way‘s definition, Kheang Un declares that Cambodia is a hybrid regime 
―stuck between outright authoritarianism and full-fledged democracy‖.80 One major party is 
dominating the electoral arena and has been dominating it for a very long time, the CPP along 
with their leader Hun Sen.
81
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3.2 The Development of Cambodia’s Political System 
3.2.1 Early Political Developments and the Elections of 1993 
Since the Cambodian independence, the country has experienced a long duration of political 
instability. King Sihanouk ruled during the first 15 years of independence but caused 
turbulence, such as between the relations of Vietnam and US. The Lon Nol period before the 
Khmer Rouge was an unstable time where the outcome of the political struggles was unsure.
82
 
When the Khmer Rouge took over, the country and its people saw a never before seen 
political ideology. Their revolution was an extensive one, wiping out everything that was 
formerly known, changing the very core norm of society. And so, because of this complete 
transformation, going back to even status quo requires a wide-ranging change in the political 
structure, Fernando holds. Thus, what had to happen after 1979 until at least 1989 when the 
Paris peace talks started was yet another fundamental change from the Khmer Rouge‘s norms 
to the new ones that were introduced.
83
  
After the PRK takeover in 1979, Hun Sen was fast to gain power over the nation. 
Before the UNTAC elections, he had gained knowledge in the international arena, especially 
UN, become prime minister, developed a wide administration of trust from his colleagues and 
he had overcome any domestic political rivalry and international efforts to bring him and his 
regime down. He was not planning on giving this power up.
84
 The 1993 elections was the first 
time the CPP and Hun Sen experienced a challenge to the party. And so, CPP‘s use of 
political violence came into the picture. The fact that they were in power for so long made the 
usage of the state machinery favorable to them. Even if FUNCIMPEC won the UNTAC 
sponsored elections in 1993, Hun Sen made sure that he was still in a coalition government, 
holding a post as co-prime minister. Important to recall is that after 1979 takeover and before 
the 1993 elections, CPP had ruled Cambodia uncontested.
85
  
Going back to the subject of the Paris Peace Accords, the terms that were agreed after 
this, even though democratic, do not express the reality of the Cambodian way of life which 
therefore makes them surreal and mere words on paper. Democracy in all its beauty cannot 
change the culture, values and ideals of a country just by being stated in a document. This is 
why Linton asserts that these terms, even if agreed upon, do not guarantee institutions that 
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will uphold them, since the Cambodian legal system was severely flawed to start with, and is 
still flawed today. She claims that, even though many laws have been passed since the 
Constitution was promulgated, the leaders of the country do not want this system of 
democracy, since the system remains corrupted and unfair.
86
  
Yes, democracy and peace was presented by the UNTAC, but to change the back bone 
of a society, it takes more. ―One UN-administered election does not make a democracy‖, 
Etcheson stresses.
87
 Like Fernando holds, it takes more than just one elite replacing another to 
change a society, and even if at the same time a liberal norm is presented, it cannot 
fundamentally change the political environment at once, unless there is an active movement 
from all sides to fulfill it.
88
  
Needless to say, the elections did not change Cambodia‘s political environment. Even 
if FUNCIMPEC got the majority of votes, Hun Sen thrived in a political culture where he had 
many loyalists, securing him a continuation of power.
89
 However, after the cold war, a state‘s 
legitimacy became very important for its recognition in the international community. 
According to Kheang, this is a realization that the CPP got after the 1993 elections, which is 
why it was important for them that the elections were seen as free and fair. More importantly, 
international recognition means financial and technical support from bilateral and multilateral 
sources. In fact, Kheang shows, approximately half of the governmental budget came from 
such sources in the past ten years.
90
  
Another lesson that the CPP learned after the 1993 elections was the manipulation of 
patronage politics. During the first years of the 1990s, patronage networks controlled 
Cambodia and its political landscape more than the CPP, but towards the end of that decade, 
Hun Sen had turned that into his advantage and successfully tied himself to business tycoons 
and military leaders.
91
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3.2.2 Electoral Manipulation and the Elections of 1998 
Even if there was a relative political stability during the coalition time, the co-prime ministers 
were striving for more power and could not rule in agreement. Hun Sen and his party staged a 
coup d‘état in 1997 after which National Assembly elections were held. The most typical kind 
of abuse in these types of regimes is the violation of electoral rules where competition is 
eliminated either de jure or de facto. Typical characteristics of elections in hybrid regimes are 
large-scale abuses of state power and lack of transparency combined with harassment of 
opposition.
92
   
CPP‘s campaign in the 1998 elections was a campaign covering extensive parts of the 
voters‘ everyday lives. They created an environment in the villages, where the villagers felt 
they were friends with the CPP and members of a bigger community; the villagers got CPP 
membership cards and there was also the distribution of gifts. Although the gifts were small, 
they were representative of the protection that the villagers got, and so the annulment of gifts 
meant annulment of that protection. Moreover, the villagers were organized in groups of ten 
with local CPP supporters as group leaders. One of the instructions that the leaders had was to 
create a relationship with the voters that would sustain until the election, and when the time 
came the leaders would escort their respective groups to the polls. Another instruction was to 
collect thumbprints. This was often accompanied with subtle threats against personal security 
together with pledges of allegiance that were intertwined with rituals and religion. Thus, this 
was a widespread form of intimidation fused with symbolism that together with the impact of 
the 1997 coup created an aura of fear.
93
  
A Human Rights Watch report stresses the fact that these elections took place in an 
environment where the CPP controlled all the significant government and state institutions.
94
 
Nevertheless, gaining 41% (FUNCIMPEC got 32 % and the Sam Rainsy Party, SRP, got 14 
%) of the votes did not give the constitutionally required qualified majority to rule the 
country. Once again CPP had to form a coalition government. Negotiations were prolonged 
and not until the King intervened did they agree to once again form a coalition with 
FUNCIMPEC, however with Hun Sen as the single prime minister.
95
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Kheang positions that the outcome did not only result in CPP strengthening its power 
as a party, but also Hun Sen as an individual leader.
96
 On the other hand, according to 
Kheang, the coup d‘état resulted in a major drawback for the Cambodian democratization, 
inducing the public with fear of regression to authoritarianism. However, the elections 
continued. 
 
3.2.3 Political Turbulence and the Elections of 2003 
The National Assembly elections in 2003 were preceded by political violence and there was a 
number of high profile killings and voting intimidation.
97
 Human Rights Watch reported that 
at the time both international and local NGOs had stated that the CPP were responsible for the 
organized violence and intimidation. Political pluralism was still not a developed 
establishment in Cambodia‘s society, and the CPP actions as a party were difficult to 
distinguish from the actions of the state.
98
  
Kheang points to the importance of rural Cambodians for the CPP. The urban voters 
are more likely to be affected by issues such as corruption, unfair working conditions and 
treatment of small businesses etc. in their everyday lives, which is why they are more inclined 
to vote for opposing parties that support their opinions. The SRP‘s growing popularity is an 
indication of this being true. Seeing as rural Cambodians make up the clear majority of the 
population, having their support is incredibly important. This makes them the focal point of 
election races. What gave the CPP an even stronger foothold in the political landscape was the 
decentralization of politics to the rural areas. Until the first commune elections in 2002, the 
commune chiefs appointed were the ones from the PRK era. This made the patronage network 
more extensive, and the CPP could grow stronger through gift-giving and support of the 
development local infrastructure.
99
  Under this hybrid democracy, votes are sealed by CPP 
officials visiting the countryside, bringing donations and promises of more donations for the 
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exchange of political support.
100
 Therefore, the commune elections in 2002 were an easy win 
for the CPP.
  
Unsurprisingly, patronage politics was CPP‘s main instrument to gather votes for the 
National Assembly elections as well, and according to Kheang, the villagers he himself talked 
to before the 2003 elections explained that they voted for the CPP because of the party‘s 
ability to offer material benefits, e.g. refurbish roads that needed to be repaired.
101
 By 2003, 
Hun Sen had devoted himself to development projects, as well as his wife Bun Rany Hun Sen. 
His strategy was to win people‘s trust over, through the use of the purse. An example is that 
he built 2,232 schools, while she built and financed three development centers ―out of their 
‗own pockets‘‖. In reality, the money came from foreign aid or loans but the projects were 
opened in their names.
102
  
Media is also a focal point in a hybrid regime, where it might be censured and state-
owned but with some independent outlets playing a very important part in offering some 
transparency to the government‘s actions.103 Most Cambodians watch TV or listen to the 
radio; this is the principal way of getting information. It then comes as no surprise that power 
over the media is crucial, something that CPP has had power over for some time now. There 
are six TV stations in Cambodia, all of them owned by or affiliated with the CPP. There are 
thirteen radio stations in Cambodia, only two of them are completely independent and one is 
owned by FUNCIMPEC. The control of these outlets is exercised through promotion of the 
CPP and especially Hun Sen, not to mention through exclusion of the opposition. Ergo, 
controlling the media means controlling the provision of information, a crucial weapon in 
times of elections.
104
 
The outcome of the elections was the same as earlier, CPP got the majority of the 
votes but there was no qualified majority for any party, resulting in a political stalemate that 
was still ongoing in 2004.
105
 To break this deadlock and avoid more lengthy delays, the 
previous requirement for qualified majority was now changed to a simple majority by the 
National Assembly (who was since earlier dominated by the CPP) with an addendum to the 
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constitution. Another coalition was created between the CPP and FUNCIMPEC with a power 
share of 60/40.
106
  
Both the 1998 and the 2003 elections were contested as fraudulent by the biggest 
opponents to CPP, the FUNCINPEC and the SRP, claiming that CPP had used violence, 
intimidation and misuse of the electoral machinery. But for their claim to have any impact 
they needed evidence of massive fraud showing that CPP‘s actions went so far as to affect the 
results of the elections, something that they did not have. Moreover, the international 
community held that even if there was some intimidation, it was not enough to affect the polls 
and the elections were to be seen as free and fair.
107
 In a hybrid regime, violations of the 
democratic rules have to be broad, frequent, systematic and serious enough to make the 
democratic institutions undependable, but at the same time not wide enough to eliminate the 
notion of and foundation for democracy.
108
 A regime that is democratic to the outside but has 
authoritarian tendencies on the inside can get away with violations of democratic rules as long 
as the violations are not frequently in the spotlight of the public.
109
 This is how CPP has 
gotten away with their violations; sustaining the democracy on the outside, but violating and 
manipulating the rules on the inside. 
Levitsky and Way explain that elections, legislatures, courts and media are inherently 
instable institutions for it gives the opposition ways to challenge the regime and respectively 
gives the ruling party an intricate dilemma; they cannot completely ignore the rules for the 
sake of being frozen out by its society as well as the international community, nor can they let 
the opposition set their agenda.
110
 Therefore, in hybrid regimes, the rulers‘ intent is not to 
destroy the democratic institutions, nor are they able to do so. The tactic is to use and 
manipulate the rules in a more behind-the-curtains kind of way through the use of state 
resources, bribery, denial of media coverage and harassment of opposition, and more subtle 
ways of persecution such as taxes and cooperation with judiciaries and state agencies.
111
 
Kheang points out that CPP no longer uses violence and intimidation as a strategy to gain 
authority, but instead they use the elements of patronage politics, such as gifts and 
                                                          
106
 U.K Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Country Information: Cambodia, available at: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/asia-
oceania/cambodia?profile=politics&pg=7 15 September 2009 
107
 Kheang Un, p. 207 
108
 Levitsky and Way, p. 58 
109
 Op.cit. 
110
 Levitsky and Way, p. 59 
111
 Op.cit.  
24 
 
construction projects in return of favors and political support.
 112
 That way the democratic 
institutions can remain intact, while the CPP can remain in authority.  
 
3.2.4 CPP’s Dominance, Hun Sen and the Elections of 2008 
The most recent National Assembly elections were held in 2008. The result was a clear 
victory for CPP, which gained more than 50% of the votes. A coalition government was 
created and today the CPP is teamed up with FUNCIMPEC with 90 seats respectively 2 seats 
in the National Assembly. Their opponents, the SRP and the Human Rights Party (HRP), got 
26 respectively 3 seats. The Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) that is currently allied with 
neither the coalition nor the opposition got 3 seats, but expressed intention to ally with 
FUNCIMPEC.
113
  
Elections in hybrid regimes are often coupled with international observing missions 
and NGOs, which is why they more often than not are conducted in a somewhat peaceful 
manner with the international presence limiting attempts of electoral fraud.
114
 For the second 
time around, the elections in Cambodia in 2008 were observed by both the European Union 
Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) and a delegation by the European Parliament.
115
 As 
explained, political violence, intimidation and harassment was earlier a big problem. The last 
decade has been stable comparing to its history though. During the recent elections the 
situation had gotten much better, but Cambodia is still a post-conflict society where political 
instability remains a problem.
116
 The EP delegation found that the elections were peaceful in 
general, but not entirely fair according to international standards.
117
 EU EOM found that there 
was a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the election administration.  
Levitsky and Way explain that in hybrid regimes where rules get manipulated, 
political races between government and opposition end up being very uneven.
118
 This is 
evidenced by Cambodia‘s campaigning situation in 2008 between the CPP and the opposition, 
a campaign which was very uneven and the regulation for it weak.
119
 Connecting to this, EU 
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EOM also noticed a free usage of state resources by the governing CPP, and the flow of 
money and gifts coming from candidates.
120
  
Furthermore, the EP delegation showed that the village chiefs, as in the 1998 elections, 
have an important role in the nation‘s institutional structure; they have the power to affect the 
voters within their respective villages. The clear majority of them being aligned with the CPP, 
combined with a political culture of clientelism, give a favorable situation for the CPP.
121
 The 
EP delegation concluded that the political landscape still was profoundly biased in favor of 
the governing party.
122
  
AHRC also signalizes the partiality of the body that is supposed to review Cambodia‘s 
electoral process and serve as an election dispute adjudicating mechanism, The National 
Election Committee (NEC); this election management board is dominated by the CPP, their 
members appointed by the CPP-dominated National Assembly, the majority of the NEC 
personnel CPP supporters and that the appeals against NEC judgments are heard by the CPP-
majority led Constitutional Council.
123
 And just as during the elections in 2003, the EP 
delegation found that the actions of CPP and the state were still inseparable.
124
 
CPP asserts that they bring security, stability and prosperity, claiming that they have 
brought economic development to the country and made infrastructural improvements.
125
 At 
the same time, HRW show in their 2009 world report an infrastructure with widespread 
impunity where government officials can get away with practically anything, that corruption 
is raging as well as illegal plundering of natural resources.
126
  
Even though the CPP succeeded in drawing people to voting participation, it was not a 
―genuine popular political participation‖ that is needed to promote the democracy in a society. 
Moreover voting, a genuine democracy requires the people‘s involvement in the society 
through opinion-building and party partaking, something that is not encouraged through the 
short solutions of patronage politics – a gift for a vote.127 Kheang holds that as long as 
patronage politics are spread out in a regime, the elements of liberal democracy will not be 
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able to get a foothold in the regime. Instead it will lead to corruption and counterfeit political 
participation.
128
  
The hybrid regime in Cambodia, Kheang says, is the result of Hun Sen‘s leadership 
and CPP dominating the system, recalling that Hun Sen himself has stated that ―he intends to 
stay in power for another decade or so‖.129 Even if Hun Sen is a part of the CPP, his power 
extends beyond the party politics. Being the skilled leader he is, he has succeeded in building 
up a base of power that is no longer connected to his Party, but him as an individual with 
networks that go beyond the state machinery.
130
 Hun Sen himself has affirmed that some of 
his financial resources come from donations from business tycoons. Through the CPP-owned 
media, Hun Sen has advertised that many of his development projects are sponsored by the 
donations of these businessmen. These businessmen claim that they do it for humanitarian 
reasons, but Kheang with many other critics argue that it is for the sake of buying themselves 
state influence, privileges and protection.
131
  
Patronage politics breed corruption in the way that government officials have to keep 
contributing to the party purse and their superiors by giving them some of their own earnings, 
at the same time as they are trying to keep as much as possible for themselves. And so the 
whole government is full with officials that expect and are expected to do favors.
132
  
 
4. An Analysis of the Political Development 
 
The political development in Cambodia has been one of ups and downs but persistently 
characterized by authoritarianism, something that has been recognized.
133
 As it is showed, for  
the longest time, the Cambodian people have been controlled by power-hungry leaders:  the 
French, Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen. Authoritarianism is defined as a 
political system where the power is concentrated in the hands of one leader or of a small 
political elite, where the government is not responsible to the people. In such a system, the 
people are obedient to authority which more often than not exercise power arbitrarily and 
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disregard the established bodies of law. Needless to say, the rule of law is not the governing 
principle in such a society. Another characteristic is the limitation or exclusion of 
competition.
134
 The political development in Cambodia demonstrates all of these 
characteristics. The people of Cambodia have not had much control in this political 
development, instead it has been the elitist leaders and their parties that have obtained power 
through different methods and kept it by violence, the threat of it or by material promises: 
there was the French, Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Khmer Rouge, PRK and CPP with Hun Sen as the 
leader. They changed the country‘s political ideology completely back and forth. Hence, there 
have been many radical changes. Seeing as the country has had a historical tradition of 
colonialism, one can understand that personal liberties and the rights of the people have not 
been strong. More accordingly, the rule of law has been weak. The frameworks of the society 
have traditionally been set by the leaders, and the Cambodian people have subdued to living 
their lives within that framework, whether they liked it or not. Through the threat of violence, 
they did not have a choice. This kind of historical setting made way for violent political 
transitions by strong leaders.  
All along these previous violent political transitions, there were rules, there were 
elections and there were democratic values presented in the country. Nevertheless, they were 
not followed. And that is the corner-stone of Cambodia's political development. Even today, 
the country has a constitution consistent with human rights documents, international 
democratic standards et cetera, but these rules lay over the politics like a blanket. Underneath, 
tradition is still steering the political development, a tradition of corruption and patronage. 
This may be explained by the authoritarian character of the Cambodian system. In 
authoritarian systems there is usually a lack of developed ideological ideas. The focus is 
instead on the grip of power. The exercise of power is then rather practical and the system 
characterized by corruption.
135
 Yes, communism was a strong ideology that scarred the 
country deeply, and democracy is a strong ideology as well, but the latter did not turn the 
country‘s practices around so completely as the Khmer Rouge‘s communism did. As has been 
shown, power is more prominent in the Cambodian system than democratic values. Why is 
this? The development will be viewed upon through three different lenses: a conservative, a 
socio-cultural traditional and an economic one.  
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4.1 A Conservative Approach 
Though many would probably disagree, I dare to say that the political development with 
regards to the political transitions in Cambodia can be explained through the view of 
conservatism. According to the theory of conservatism a society is something that grows and 
one should let it do so step by step, instead of revolutionizing what is historically known.
136
 It 
is up to the political parties to respond to changing circumstances.
137
 According to Minogue, 
conservatism is not against change, it is merely a question about the source to change, i.e. 
where change should occur. In that view of the conservatism theory, what is necessary for 
change is a strong framework where societal issues can be worked out for themselves, instead 
of looking to regulate every step of it and especially in the complexities of legislatures and 
thus putting it into the hands of the legislator. Society can evolve without being dictated to 
change. Minogue compares this view with the maxim ―hard cases make bad law‖ in that 
legislation should not cause change, but the society itself within given frameworks.
138
 Thus, 
changes should be made within a set framework of society and not by tight legal regulations. 
One can see the violent political transitions, i.e. changes, as something radical, something that 
conservatism does not sympathize with. In that sense, conservatism appreciates and upholds 
identities and not change.
139
 Violent power transitions might thus be something inconsistent 
with a step-by-step change in society. But what if that is the tradition of the society? What if 
that is the identity of the political system? What happens if that is the framework? These 
questions have lead me to apply the theory of conservatism here, since the political 
development in Cambodia has happened in a societal framework where violent power 
transitions by elitists is historically traditional. 
Already established identities and habits are respected, and conserved if you so will.
140
 
Patronage and corruption have been ruling the Cambodian society for at least the past thirty 
years. As explained earlier, the Cambodian political system is drenched in patronage politics 
and corruption, upheld by the rulers. Ordinary Cambodians deal with bribes in their everyday 
contacts with authorities and social services. This identity of the Cambodian society is 
something that has been at the very least tolerated by the people. This has become their habit, 
their tradition. When UNTAC entered Cambodian ground and when the new democratic 
constitution came, it did not change Cambodia. Like conservatism says, change needs to 
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happen for itself, by the people and the parties, in a set framework. UNTAC could not do that 
for Cambodia, neither could a new constitution stated in a document.  
However, this is as far as I will apply the theory. The theory of conservatism is in this 
case merely used to show that even violent political transitions can be seen as traditions and 
identity. Regarding values and the application of norms within the society, conservatism is 
obviously not fit to explain the ideological transitions. Conservatism goes against dictating 
change, which is something that Cambodia‘s political leaders have done. However, smart 
leaders like Hun Sen have not been known for directly and openly dictating rules and 
changes. Instead, his almost thirty year long rule of the country has been to use the existing 
institutions, creating an illusion of a democracy, but where he is ruling almost incontestably.  
 
4.2 A Societal, Cultural and Traditional Approach 
Democracy was presented in Cambodia with UNTAC, something that Öjendal refers to as the 
―big bang‖, because of the system being too different from previous and because of the 
difficulties of implementing it.
141
 A problem for the Cambodian political development that 
one must consider is this presentation of democracy into a society that has had a completely 
different tradition. Etcheson, with many other voices, hold that the UN goals were too 
optimistic as well as UN‘s assessment of the situation after they left. He holds that history 
shows that democracy is a long process, emerging democracies in East Asia being a clear 
example. Certain social and economic preconditions need to be fulfilled for the sustainment of 
a liberal democratic system, such as a strong labor force, a strong middle class with 
bargaining power etc. Conditions that did not exist in Cambodia.
142
 UN‘s plan was to alter the 
political interactions in Cambodia, but the UN intervention could not change the habits of the 
Cambodian politicians, nor did it change their actions and policies into democratic ones. 
Instead, gaining and sustaining power was still on their mind which was demonstrated by 
their actions. The political situation in Cambodia did not alter completely after UN. However, 
it did change the direction of the political development towards a democracy, but nevertheless 
in instability and political violence.
143
  
Lizée explains that the institutional legal framework presented by the UNTAC could not 
have an immediate democratic effect since the organizational structure stems from the ideas 
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of the West where it works due to the political structures permitting such a framework. This is 
because the resort to democratic tools and institutions are a function of the traditions and 
history in the West, but that is unfamiliar with the traditions in Cambodia.
144
 He connects the 
development of politics and institutional frameworks with the religions of the country, 
Brahmanism and Theravada Buddhism. Fundamentally, these two result in societal traditions 
that rest on ideas that human beings have little effect over their surroundings and that the 
society is divided by class and rank and not by popular institutions. This gives that social 
interactions obviously differ in Cambodia comparing with the West, something that was not 
touched upon by the UN. When UNTAC then presented a liberal democratic framework, it 
was an institutionalization that could not be recognized by the Cambodian society. However, 
with the international community pressing on, the Cambodian government made concessions 
but this did not result in a deep societal transformation. The model could not be directly 
transferred to a society that lacked the institutional roots needed.
145
 For the ideology of 
liberalism to rule a society there needs to be a consensus among some basic moral values, 
such as tolerance, progress, liberty, individualism etc.
146
 Cambodia lacks this to this day, 
which is why democracy is still such an intricate issue under development. 
 
4.3 An Economic Approach 
Political development can also be tied to an economic perspective. Öjendal puts forth that the 
socio-economic level in Cambodia is one of the lowest in the world. Citing Sørensen, he 
holds that an adequate socio-economic level is required for the sustainability of democracy in 
a Third World Society.
147
 Öjendal then illuminates the economic issues of the country and the 
linkage to democracy: underpaid military being one of them, corruption being another.
148
  
An unstable economy has been following Cambodia‘s development at least ever since 
Sihanouk‘s time when his policy lead to a cut off of US economic aid, nationalization of the 
foreign trade, losses of revenue, agricultural problems etc.
149
 As the economy was getting 
worse so was his power grip getting weaker. When Lon Nol took over, there was a slight 
adjustment to the instability in the economy. However with the sudden US aid corrupting 
state officials and with the US bombings causing a lack of farmland the economy was not 
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getting better. Au contraire, the poor economy and the lack of farmland was one of the 
reasons why the Khmer Rouge could take over.
150
  
Since the people working for the government did not have any strong ideological ties, 
but were being corrupted by money, their loyalty to the government was not strong. But 
neither was the leadership. Since the lack of farmland lead to a flood of people to Phom Penh, 
it made it easier for the Khmer Rouge to capture as many people as possible. Concurrently a 
concentration of people made way for collectivization. And when the city life was falling 
apart, Cambodia was taken over by Khmer Rouge.
151
 Yet again, a connection can be made to 
the poor economic situation in the country. Even the Khmer Rouge communist policy was 
tied to economic development of Cambodia through mass production of rice.
152
 Needless to 
say, the economy did not develop as they wished. Gottesman paints a picture of a ruined 
economy after the Khmer Rouge that goes beyond poverty: unusable land, small amounts of 
rice seed left for the coming harvest, slaughtered or dead cattle, agricultural tools and tractors 
ruined, a commercial structure in ruins, broken down vehicles, damaged roads, railroads, 
bridges stores etc.
153
 And this picture but merely exemplifies the horrific state of the country.  
After the PRK took over and patronage politics became the standard, people were 
joining in the party for the sake of collecting bribes and taxes.
154
 Important to note though is 
that the idea of collectivization did not end with the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, it 
continued with PRK. But it did not last long. Gottesman puts forth that the ideological 
connection to collectivization was not strong and that state officials were selling off land for 
their own gain, a problem well known in Cambodia.
155
 Like pointed out earlier, ideology did 
not seem that important to the leaders of Cambodia, with the exception of the Khmer Rouge. 
The PRK tried to sustain collectivization and socialism, but as Gottesman describes it – they 
stopped caring when their own interest shifted to the other side, towards a more open 
economy.
156
 As a consequence, the political direction changed as well. Yet again, the political 
development had connections to the economic situation in the country.  
Today patronage and corruption are more than ever engraved in the country‘s economy, 
being a part of the country‘s culture, CPP‘s tradition, a part of Hun Sen‘s leadership. 
Accordingly, the economic situation and economic incentives play a huge part in the way 
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Cambodia is governed. It might thus be true then, that the economy needs to get better for 
democracy to get a foot-hold in the society.  
 
5. The Cambodian Legal System 
 
5.1 The Legal System in a Hybrid Regime 
A significant feature of a hybrid regime is a weak legislature and judiciary where the ruling 
party is influencing the laws being made and affecting the judges by bribery, extortion etc. 
Patronage, corruption and blackmail are, like mentioned above, typical in this kind of 
system.
157
 Like the chicken and the egg, it is disputed whether it is the legal system that needs 
to be reformed first in order to get a change in the political system or whether it is vice versa. 
Fernando holds that the development of the legal system is of tremendous significance for the 
political development in Cambodia, since it is reasonable that the dysfunctional legal system 
makes the political system stay at a status quo.
158
  
 
5.2 Cambodia’s Legal System and the Effects of Politics 
Cambodia‘s legal system has at the very least clearly been affected by politics ever since its 
independence. After the country fully broke free from France in 1953, it was a French civil 
law tradition. Then authoritarianism and military dictatorship spread its roots in the system, to 
finally be completely eradicated by the Khmer Rouge. After this, the Vietnamese puppet 
regime PRK tried to build up the system, now with a Soviet-based influence.
159
 The Soviet 
system was not one that appreciated law, and so development was slow. There was the 
enactment of a few laws and establishment of courts, but the legal education was least 
prioritized.
160
 There has been a clash within the government between the liberals in the 
Ministry of Justice that want to develop the rule of law and other figures in the government 
that want to hinder it. Therefore, the legal system has been the weakest part of the political 
and economic structure. The executive‘s power, i.e. the prime minister, was all along the 
strongest, even within the legislature‘s branch.161 The current regime was a product of the 
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UNTAC sponsored elections in 1993 after which a new constitution was promulgated, still 
with Soviet influences.
162
  
 
5.3 The Constitution, Rights and the Rule of Law in Cambodia 
The constitution establishes a liberal democracy with a multiparty system. A system of checks 
and balances is supposed to make sure that there is a separation of powers between the three 
branches of government- the judiciary, legislature and executive. It stipulates the principle of 
the independence of the judiciary and puts upon them the power to review the executive.
 163
 
The legislative branch is bicameral, and the executive is comprised by the King which is the 
chief of state and has no power to rule, and the prime minister which is head of government 
and has de facto ruling power.
 164
 The legal education is very important for the establishment 
of democracy and the rule of law. And even if it has been improved and a Bar Association 
established, it is still very much politicized and affected by corruption.
165
  
Civil rights in Cambodia are not highly respected, and The Economist reports that there 
are arbitrary arrests, detentions and torture.
166
 Fernando holds that the Constitution of 
Cambodia is contradictory to its own legal system, which is why it is working so poorly.
167
 
Criminal investigation and the administration of criminal justice are two examples that 
Fernando gives on the contradiction between law and practice. The judicial police and the 
military police, which are Cambodia‘s two law enforcement agencies, formed their own 
practices on how to handle those procedures after 1979 and up until the ratification of the new 
laws in 1992. And so, even when the new acts were passed, they continued performing the 
procedures according to their old methods, disregarding the new rules. Fernando spells out the 
customary practices of the administration of criminal justice as they continued even after the 
enactment of the Constitution; when investigating a criminal, the legal practitioners within the 
different institutions collaborate to either obtain a confession from the detained or to let him 
go. Thus, focus is on the confession, which they try to gain in all kinds of ways, including 
torture.
168
 Needless to say that torture is prohibited by the human rights documents, and ergo 
the Constitution by incorporation. The new acts were influenced by democratic rules based on 
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fairness and human rights, while the practiced methods stem from a communist era when the 
legal structure was influenced by the political motivation of protecting the state against the 
individuals, a contradiction to today‘s legal structure. The whole legal culture before the 
enactment of the new constitution was influenced by totalitarian notions. That is why, 
Fernando holds, it was difficult for the legal practitioners to change their ways, literally and 
psychologically, and even three years after the ratification they were still following their old 
rules.
169
 This report came out in 1998. However, Human Rights Watch inform that even to 
date, 11 years later, it is not unusual for the police to use torture to get a confession from a 
suspect.
170
 AHRC as well, report that torture and ill treatment are still methods used on 
suspects and accused.
171
 
According to Gottesman, the criminal code that Cambodia had until 1993 ―was barely 
a legal document at all‖ that served to protect the state and the revolution from anyone who 
was against it.
172
 There were those within the Ministry of Justice that wanted to reform the 
codes. To exemplify a dispute, there was the question about whether the police should get 
search warrants before entering someone‘s house or if they could freely enter upon suspicion. 
The discussion about the question came to a deadlock and Hun Sen was assigned to solve it. 
Hun Sen was against the strict rule of law implementation that the Ministry of Justice tried to 
put into the legislation, and he did not like the human rights provisions that they wrote.
173
 
Within the Council of Ministers, there were complaints that the rigidness was in the way of 
quick and effective negotiations. Stating that, while a search warrant on the one hand is 
legally correct, it is not accustomed to the situation as it was in Cambodia in 1985 on the 
other. Therefore, the police acting without a search warrant was appropriate, even though not 
in accordance with law. But Hun Sen could not make the two opposing sides to agree on the 
question, nor could he write any laws. What he did instead was to create a new office within 
the Council of Ministers that was assigned with the task of drafting laws. And so when the 
draft came, the question about search warrants was removed. Remaining unregulated, the 
police could continue with their previous methods.
174
 Even the general prosecutor of the 
Supreme Court described in a report in 1988 a lawless Cambodia where lengthy detentions, 
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arbitrary confiscations and an indifference to the justice system were raging.
175
  At the same 
time there were those within the justice system that were pushing for an end to the impunity. 
However, the fight for legality in Cambodia is many times a question of institutional rivalry, 
something that could be shown by individual ministers changing their opinions as they were 
changing institutions, acting with ―personal interests and political calculations‖.176 
The establishment of the rule of law has hitherto not been successful in Cambodia, 
AHRC reports. They show that many actions of the government and especially Hun Sen have 
been unconstitutional. But the supervising mechanism that is the Constitutional Council is 
majority led by the CPP, and there is thus not much that will be done about their actions. 
Accordingly, they are not known to have declared any action of the government as 
unconstitutional.
177
  
In 1998 Fernando explained that one of the problems of the Cambodian legal system 
was the status of the judges and the prosecutors; they had the same status which made the 
whole criminal investigation process more difficult and unreliable.
178
 Eleven years later, 
AHRC positions the same problem. The constitution prescribes a law that is supposed to 
guarantee the independence of the judges and prosecutors. Despite governmental promises, 
such a law has however not yet been enacted. AHRC holds that this delay is because of the de 
facto political control over the judiciary. Another corollary between the judiciary and politics 
is the legal training for judges and prosecutors with their Academy of Judicial Profession 
being directly placed under the Office of the Council of Ministers whose leaders are CPP 
members. For that reason, the judiciary cannot independently protect the Cambodian people 
and guarantee them their constitutionally recognized rights.
179
 
According o AHRC, the government does not respect the constitutionally required 
legislative process and many times makes laws through orders, an example being the 
―notification letter‖, which is used by the Prime Minister or his office. It has no official status 
as a law, executive order or a regulation nor is there any parliamentary oversight or judicial 
review, and yet it trumps court judgments. This political interference in the judicial process is 
                                                          
175
 Ibid., p. 255 
176
 Ibid., p. 256 
177
 AHRC, p. 20 
178
 Fernando, p. 15-18 
179
 AHRC, p. 21 
36 
 
unconstitutional, AHRC concludes, with the consequences being an even broader power in 
the hands of the Prime Minister and a wide-spread corruption.
180
  
The UN Declaration of Human Rights and all other rights documents are now 
recognized and respected in the constitution, as well as due process of law and prohibition of 
retroactive laws.
181
 However in practice, human rights are not highly respected. A report from 
an independent UN expert declared in August this year that the human rights situation in 
Cambodia is worrying, the judiciary being especially troublesome. The Special Rapporteur 
Surya Subedi
182
 reported to the UN that ―The rule of law is weak in the country. The judiciary 
is not as independent as it should be. Some of the core political rights such as the freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly have been undermined‖. Furthermore he highlighted the 
problem of impunity, but was positive about the fact that the Government now showed a 
willingness to engage with him about these issues.
183
 
Gottesman puts forth that albeit a favorable political environment; changing the ways of 
the judiciary, police and military takes a very long time.
184
 Even if you can create an 
institution under a very short period of time, the indoctrinated actions of individuals you 
cannot. And so, although the legal framework now provides tools for a democratic and just 
system, more needs to be done. It is still very much underdeveloped, demanding more work 
and engagement from every branch. The executive branch, dominated by the CPP, still has the 
most power within the legal system and does not yet prioritize domestic legal reform. This 
gives a legal system that is not respected and a legal process that is many times interfered 
with.
185
 The judges, with their low salaries, many times accept bribes. This gives a system 
where laws are being disregarded. The legislature, even if it is bicameral, is dominated by the 
CPP in both the National Assembly and the Senate. This gives a system where the political 
party can set the agenda in the legislature and steer the laws being made. The broadcast media 
in Cambodia is owned by the CPP, even if there are some struggles towards free press. 
Finally, this gives a system where information does not run freely but is controlled by the one 
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political party that has the strongest hold over the country. Ultimately this means that CPP‘s 
power has its hold of all important parts of the infrastructure and the information.
186
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5.4 Recent Developments in Cambodia’s Legal System  
Since the first resolution was adopted in Cambodia in 1993 by the UN Human Rights 
Commission, HRW reports, the government has made very few steps on reforming the 
legislature and judiciary.
187
 In 2008 there were no judicial or legal reforms. They hold that the 
Supreme Council of Magistracy continues to be inadequate and politicized, even though the 
institution is supposed to guarantee judicial independence. The Constitutional Council on the 
other hand, is supposed to make sure that new legislative acts are constitutional, a task in 
which they are failing.
188
 The Global Integrity corruption report shows that even if review has 
been done by the Constitutional Council before, it is something that is rarely done.
189
 
A central incident in the downward spiral of Cambodia‘s human rights situation, 
according to many, was the resignation of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Prof. Yash Ghai. This post was created after the 
Paris Peace Agreement so that the human rights situation in the country could continue to be 
closely monitored. To the Cambodian government‘s and Prime Minister Hun Sen‘s dislike, 
Ghai found numerous repeated human rights violations. Ghai devoted himself to honestly 
examine the situation by meeting officials in the government, people in the Cambodian civil 
society, victims of human rights violations and visiting places where violations had occurred. 
What he repeatedly commented on was the government‘s preference for the wealthy and 
powerful and the use of the poor, the lack of judicial independence, the executive‘s control 
over it and the power being concentrated in Hun Sen‘s hands and his nonchalance for human 
rights. Since Ghai‘s appointment in 2005 and up until his resignation in 2008, he had had a 
very hard time with Hun Sen and his government, with them disregarding his reports, 
attacking his personality and country, denying meetings with him and asking the UN for his 
leave. This finally ended with Ghai‘s resignation, and with his resignation also came the end 
of the post of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia. 
The post is now replaced by a Special Rapporteur,
190
 and presently held by Mr. Surya Prasad 
Subedi from Nepal.
191
  HRW has called for a renewed mandate for this new post, pointing to 
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the fact that since his appointment in 2008 he was only able to pay Cambodia one short visit 
without the ability to make a deep assessment of the human rights situation.
192
  
HRW stated recently in a news article that the political situation in Cambodia has gone 
worse. Political suppression of opposition has increased as well as political violence. 
Harassment, threats, violence, arbitrary arrests and detention are not unusual tactics used by 
government officials to suppress dissents, from whichever direction they might be coming 
from. HRW points to the weakness of the judiciary and their reports show that the 
government is corrupting the legal system by counterfeit legal action to silence opposition, 
such as filing unjustifiable lawsuits against critics for criminal defamation, disinformation, 
and related charges.
193
 An example is the case of Moeung Sonn, the head of the Khmer 
Cultural Civilization Foundation. He suggested that a new lighting system at the Angkor Wat 
temple could damage the 600-year-old building, and for that he got sentenced to two years in 
jail in absentia for "disinformation".
194
 ―With increased suppression of opposition political 
parties, independent media, and civil society, Cambodia is moving closer towards becoming 
an authoritarian, one-party state, with few-if any- checks and balances.―195  
Another worrying development in Cambodia is the government‘s plan to regulate 
NGOs. This kind of human rights observers have complained about the violations in 
Cambodia for a long while, something that has frustrated the CPP led government. Almost 
immediately after winning the elections and disguising in concerns about terrorists funding 
the NGOs, Hun Sen informed that the government would enact a new law regulating them.
196
 
AHRC explains that financial funding like that already is covered by an anti-terrorism law, 
holding that these concerns are hardly founded. AHRC illuminates the suspicion that what the 
government is doing actually might be an attempt to control the human rights NGOs activities 
in order to dampen criticism against them. There are already laws restricting some of the 
NGOs activities. AHRC holds that there is not much that could restrict the government 
enacting any NGO law they want because of the CPP majority in the government, the anti-
NGO attitude amongst them, the weak opposition and the diminished activity of international 
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organizations monitoring human rights.
197
 With even more restricted NGOs, human rights 
will get even weaker, AHRC worries, since honest and impartial observations will be made 
difficult.  
HRW holds that the past year in Cambodia has been one of human rights violations, 
specifically of freedoms of expression, association, and assembly.
198
  The right to freedom of 
expression and assembly includes the right to hold peaceful demonstrations; this is a basic 
human right included in the human rights documents that Cambodia incorporated in its 
constitution and bound itself upon. However, in Cambodia there is a ban on peaceful public 
demonstrations; a ban that is forcefully enforced. An example of this is a group of Buddhist 
monks that were assaulted by a riot force police armed with batons and shields, when they 
were on their way to the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh to hand in a petition for the 
release of fellow monks with the same indigenous origin that were in prison in Vietnam.
199
 
Even if Cambodia has a stronger press freedom then many of its neighbor countries, it was 
dealt a severe blow in 2008 when a journalist, suspected to be affiliated with the opposition, 
and his son were gunned down in broad daylight in Phnom Penh; an incident that nobody in 
the media business failed to notice, an incident that damaged press freedom in Cambodia as a 
whole. But even so, AHRC holds, media in Cambodia was not much safer or freer from 
government intervention before the murders.
200
  
In their newest world report, HRW positions that Cambodia continued to move 
towards authoritarianism in 2008 as CPP and Hun Sen won the elections by means that were 
criticized by both the EU and UN.
201
  
 
5.5 Impunity in Cambodia’s Legal System 
Cambodia is a ―culture of impunity‖, as Etcheson refers to it. It is a society where the 
powerful can do what they want at the expense of the weak, without being restricted by laws 
and institutions. In fact, impunity is deeply institutionalized and held up by supporting laws, 
customs and behaviors. This is something that is acknowledged as a serious problem. While 
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impunity has always been of great power for Cambodian politicians, the rule of law has not. It 
never got a firm foothold in the Cambodian society.
202
 
Even though reports about impunity in Cambodia keep coming out, Gottesman 
contains, the government keeps ignoring them while their officials, the police and the soldiers 
keep abusing the system without prosecution.
203
 The Cambodian League for the Promotion 
and Defense of Human Rights (LICHADO), a Cambodian human rights NGO, reported in 
2007 that impunity is one of the biggest problems in the country. It is prevalent in the 
everyday life of Cambodian civilians, as well as on a higher level between politicians and 
government officials and their relatives; it covers every area in the Cambodian 
institutionalism. There are wealthy or powerful people that commit crimes and then buy their 
way out of punishment by paying financial compensation to the victims or their families. 
There are a number of murders that are unsatisfactory prosecuted or not prosecuted at all, in 
recent years especially numerous high-profile killings of the opposition. In 1997, there was a 
grenade attack on a demonstration led by Sam Rainsy when at least 16 people were killed and 
many more wounded. According to LICHADO, this is a clear example of the prevailing 
impunity in Cambodia, since no one to this day has been put to justice for it.
204
 Another 
example is the fight between CPP supporters and FUNCIMPEC supporters, also 1997, where 
approximately 100 people were killed, without anyone being prosecuted for it either.
205
 
One can question who is responsible for this. The institutions‘ responsibilities are 
intertwined in an institutionalism where the cornerstones of democracy are supposed to be 
sharing the burden, but the actors of the institutions are instead putting the blame on each 
other; the courts claim that they cannot do anything without reports coming from the 
prosecutors and victims while the police are stepping back from responsibility claiming that 
they cannot do anything when victims accept compensation. In reality, they are both wrong; 
prosecutors are obliged to investigate all crimes that come to their attention, even without 
reports, as well as the police is obliged to investigate all criminal offenses since settlement 
outside of the courts is prohibited.
206
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In his third report to the General Assembly, Yash Ghai stated that the judiciary is 
widely controlled by the government. The judiciary as well as the prosecutors get instructions 
from the government on how to handle cases, regardless of evidence or law. This means that 
governmental officials are sheltered from the law of Cambodia, a system of impunity that also 
covers their family and friends, ―while others are prosecuted for and convicted of offences 
they have not committed‖. Ghai found that political cases or cases with important interests are 
handed over to the executive‘s hands, while courts are widely used for private interests and 
denial of justice. In fact, Ghai reports, many times courts are used as a political tool where 
senior officials from the opposition might be charged for a crime without evidence, after 
which they may be pardoned if they reach a political deal with the government. Notice here 
that the government does not have the power to pardon; it lies with the King, something that 
is disregarded by the CPP. Examples of incidents like this are the cases of Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy.
207
 
The culture of impunity in Cambodia not only affects its victims and those getting away 
with crime, but the knowledge of it affects the way Cambodians live their everyday lives and 
what they think of their society. Etcheson holds that this is especially to the detriment of the 
Cambodian youth, whom this culture teaches that respect for law does not get you far, but that 
power does instead. It creates an environment where people have incentives to use each other 
rather than follow the rules stipulated.
208
 
The problem of impunity has been especially evident in the making of the Khmer 
Rouge tribunal. When the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia, they demolished all the ethical 
underpinnings, and along with it went the notion if morality. Therefore, Etcheson stresses, 
moral integrity needs to be revived in Cambodia, and this can only be done if faith in the legal 
system and belief in ones rights is revived. For this to happen, the Khmer Rouge needs to 
answer for the crimes they committed. If they could get away with the worst crimes, then 
everything under will be relativized and excused, and so the cycle of impunity will go on.
209
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5.6 Corruption in Cambodia’s Legal System 
Cambodia is known for its dishonest courts which are often criticized for not being 
independent.
210
 For a long time, both the Cambodian people and the international community 
have expressed the need for an anti-corruption law. LICHADO shows that in 2007, the 
judiciary was the worst institution when it came to corruption. The new government said, 
when taking oath after the 2008 elections, that an anti-corruption law was one of their new 
priorities. AHRC holds that this is a strategic move to calm the criticism against the CPP led 
government. But so far, this has just been empty promises without any action. At the same 
time, corruption has gotten bigger, broader and spread out at any level of Cambodia‘s 
institutionalism, and a bribe is expected for any public service. Corruption in Cambodia is one 
of the worst in the world.
211
 Among the Cambodian citizens, even though bribes might be 
considered as morally wrong, they are nevertheless accepted as common.
 
According to a 
Center for Social Development study, TI reports, people differentiate between bribes in the 
judicial system and bribes for everyday public service.
 212
 Surveys among households as well 
as businesses show that the judiciary is one of the least trusted institutions. The LICHADO 
report indicates that the judges are mostly interested in making money and finding ways of 
doing that. Judges low salaries combined with a culture of patronage politics gives a system 
that breeds corruption.
213
 Another reason for the wide-spread corruption is the connections 
between the judges and the government politicians, something that is an obvious risk for 
partiality. And with corruption being so wide-spread, its causes a general disrespect and 
distrust for the judiciary in the Cambodian society. What enhances this is the inaccessibility to 
laws and non-transparency of judicial opinions.
214
 
The promise of an anti-corruption law has not gone further than pending action. In 
2005, Hun Sen had sworn to battle corruption; he promised to clear the courts from corrupt 
judges and re-arrest the criminals they let go. At first it seemed like this was a serious attempt; 
three judges, two prosecutors and two clerks from the Phnom Penh Municipal Court were 
imprisoned after being sentenced for bribery. They were however never arrested, nor did they 
attend the hearings. What is more is that two months after, they even got acquitted after a 
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retrial. Furthermore the judges and prosecutors that were suspended during this period were 
reappointed to their judicial positions.
215
 
 
6. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
6.1 Background to the ECCC  
6.1.1 Early Steps towards Accountability 
The protracted evolvement of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia must be 
understood in the historical context of accountability.
216
 When the Khmer Rouge was 
defeated, the need for accountability and setting a precedent to deter the Khmer Rouge from 
future atrocities came up. The first trial held was in absentia by the People‘s Revolutionary 
Tribunal against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in 1979, which were found guilty of genocide and 
sentenced to death. The trials only lasted a few days, and the legitimacy of the sentences was 
not recognized due to questionable legal process and the fact that the PRK was neither 
nationally nor internationally accepted as the righteous government of Cambodia. On the 
other hand, they were also welcomed by the Cambodian society as morally and politically 
correct. Ciorciari points to the symbolic importance of the cases being a first step towards 
putting the Khmer Rouge impunity to a stop, and bringing national reconciliation on 
Cambodia‘s agenda.217  
 
6.1.2 Cold War Politics, Obstacles and Further Steps towards Accountability 
The pursuit of accountability for the Khmer Rouge atrocities became more difficult in the ten 
years that came after the first trials. Cold war politics had an immense effect on the interest of 
bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice; the great blocs of power with their alignments of 
regional powers were polarized against each other. The PRK government was seen as an 
extended hand by the Soviet, trying to take over Indochina through Vietnam. For USA, the 
most important thing in foreign politics was to resist the growing strength of Soviet, which is 
why they joined forces with China to balance out the Soviet-bloc, something that meant an 
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indirect support of the Khmer Rouge which was China‘s protégé. However, some countries in 
the US-China bloc supported the Khmer Rouge more directly with food, money and 
medicine. Ergo, if Khmer Rouge got stronger, Vietnam would get weaker, and they in turn 
would need more resources from Soviet, which would then also become weaker. And so 
accountability for the human rights atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge ended up being 
overshadowed by politics.
218
  
In fact, the only ones that supported the PRK were Soviet and their allies. For this 
reason, the PRK never managed to get international recognition nor did they succeed in 
getting a seat in the UN GA. What made it even more intricate to bring the Khmer Rouge to 
justice was the fact that UN acknowledged the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (CGDK) as representatives for Cambodia, and they could therefore hold a seat in 
the General Assembly until the peace accords in 1991, blocking any chances of international 
accountability. Hence, the international community is very much co-responsible for the 
prolonged Khmer Rouge impunity, and UNs support even gave their regime a notion of 
legitimacy.
219
 The international community was too busy with cold war politics to do 
anything about the two propositions that came in the 1980s to bring the Democratic 
Kampuchea rulers before the International Court of Justice. And so, once again the effort for 
accountability was ignored.
220
  
After the Cold War ended Cambodia got even weaker, since Soviet withdrew its 
support from Vietnam, and Vietnam did not have the same resources to uphold the PRK. The 
conflict was not getting any easier within the country and there were now four fractions at war 
with each other. The international community focused on the Khmer Rouge‘s importance in 
the peace process and during the peace talks from 1988-1990, the support from the Khmer 
Rouge was seen as fundamental for the peace in Cambodia. Ergo, putting them to trial for the 
atrocities they had committed under their four years of ruling would have threatened the peace 
process.
221
  
Finally, the Paris Peace Accords were signed and UNTAC entered the stage. However, 
they were not given a mandate to try the Khmer Rouge; they were instead to treat the Khmer 
Rouge as equals to the other parties, and the focus on accountability was still in the 
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background of the political agenda. Conversely, the Khmer Rouge did not want to cooperate 
with the internationally supported UNTAC, and they boycotted the national elections that 
were, according to the UN, successful. Finally, this pitted the international community against 
the Khmer Rouge.  
Another big step towards accountability was when the U.S. finally changed its politics 
against the Khmer Rouge and adopted the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. The new US 
policy was to support attempts holding the Khmer Rouge cadres responsible for the atrocities 
committed during 1975-1979. This act ultimately lead to the now famous Documentation 
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) being established, the first step being the creation of a special 
Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigation within the US State Department that then 
funded the Yale University‘s Cambodian Genocide Program which established an office in 
Cambodia that would gather evidence for a potential tribunal. And in a short period of time, 
DC-Cam had quickly gathered a huge amount of evidence for the Khmer Rouge atrocities.
222
 
The upswing for accountability quickly came to a halt though in 1996, with King 
Sihanouk pardoning Ieng Sary from his sentence in 1979, due to the former deputy minister 
now defecting from the Khmer Rouge and acknowledging the new government. The 
Cambodian government had a successful campaign of carrots and sticks against Khmer Rouge 
followers offering rewards to those who defected and the threat of prosecution to those who 
did not. Again, the focus was on making the Khmer Rouge weaker and not on 
accountability.
223
 
However, for the second time, Pol Pot was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment in 
1997 for the murder of Son Sen, the Khmer Rouge‘s Defense Minister. And for the second 
time, the legality of the trial was questioned. Nevertheless, Pol Pot served his sentence in 
house arrest, and died in 1998 of allegedly natural causes.
224
 
There have been efforts to try Khmer Rouge members in domestic courts ever since 
1979. Focus was on low-level perpetrators of the human rights breaches during the Khmer 
Rouge regime. However, there are not many records about those cases and many of them are 
at any rate questioned as improper and procedurally irregular. Moreover, barely any ranking 
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perpetrators were brought before a court. And so accountability was not achieved 
domestically either.
225
  
The first efforts for an international tribunal came after repeated requests for help from 
Yale University‘s CGP by Hun Sen. They drafted a law for the Cambodian government that 
called upon the international community to create an international tribunal for the prosecution 
of the perpetrators of the Khmer Rouge, adding that if gotten no help, Cambodia would 
establish a domestic tribunal for the leaders of the Khmer Rouge. Cambodia‘s Council of 
Ministers examined it and as the National Assembly Legislative Commission was to debate 
about it, the government withdrew the draft. According to Etcheson, this was because 
negotiations with Ieng Sary about defection had just started.
226
 Once again, politics came 
before legislation.  
 
6.2 Negotiations for a Tribunal 
The negotiations for an international tribunal started a lot thanks to initiatives made by 
Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, the special representative of the secretary-general of the 
UN for human rights in Cambodia. In 1996 he successfully brought the question of human 
rights breaches in Cambodia before the UN; his proposal was to establish a truth commission 
for the investigation of the Khmer Rouge breaches. What lay behind the idea was the issue of 
impunity in Cambodia. Hammarberg held that there needed to be established a truth-telling 
body where the crimes against humanity could be seriously discussed on how to handle them 
and how to investigate them.
227
  
The objective of a truth commission is to disseminate the truth about the Khmer Rouge, 
so that a true history can be created and re-told to Cambodians today and in the future.
228
 Like 
Hammaberg says: ―The process for Justice will contribute to Memory.‖229 The purpose is thus 
not a verdict but the uncovering what really happened during the Khmer Rouge regime. The 
advantage that a truth commission offers it that both victims and perpetrators can come forth 
and tell their story. This offers a broader understanding of the history. For perpetrators to have 
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the courage to tell their side of the story without getting prosecuted, they are usually granted 
some sort of amnesty in a truth commission. Something that simultaneously is a disadvantage, 
since it goes against the international norm of prosecuting crimes against humanity.
230
 On the 
other hand, Ramji holds that while a criminal tribunal might be most suited for prosecuting 
the top leaders, it does not leave room for consideration of the complexities surrounding the 
Khmer Rouge regime and its consequences. It is a sensitive matter since many people that 
were a part of the Khmer Rouge are integrated in the Cambodian society today. Lesser rank 
than top leaders will not be prosecuted, but should nevertheless be brought up to light. 
Something that a truth commission offers.  For the sake of societal rehabilitation, Ramji holds 
a truth commission to be necessary in Cambodia.
231
 The idea of a truth commission was 
however not welcomed in Cambodia, where they thought they already knew the truth. 
232
  
Etcheson tells us however that the idea was actually explored by the Cambodian 
government in 1999 when they approached officials of the South Africa‘s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. This was a short-lived project without any results and Etcheson 
puts forth that it is more likely that this was a negotiating tactic in order to go around UN‘s 
proposal of an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of the Khmer Rouge, than a 
serious interest in a truth commission.
233
  
After the proposal for a truth commission was denied, Hammarberg continued making 
efforts to bring accountability to Cambodia, and in 1997 he succeeded in convincing the co-
prime ministers Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh to formally request UN‘s help in establishing 
a judicial mechanism that would bring the Khmer Rouge leaders to justice.
234
  
One month later, in July 1997, the coup d‘état took place, something that made the UN 
very cautious and stalled the negotiations.
235
 Not until half a year later was a resolution 
adopted in the UN GA requesting the Secretary-General to examine Cambodia‘s request, 
which lead to the appointment of the Group of Experts the following year with the task of 
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visiting Cambodia.
236
 Their task was to evaluate and examine the existing evidence, the nature 
of the crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime, the possibility of holding the 
Khmer Rouge leaders accountable and recommend the best national or international legal 
option to achieve that. In 1999 they reported that the Khmer Rouge had grossly violated both 
domestic and international law, and recommended an ad hoc international tribunal due to the 
corrupt nature of the Cambodian legal system and the Cambodian judges‘ inexperience with 
these kinds of questions.
237
 Additionally, they advised that a separate truth commission be 
created for lesser members of the Khmer Rouge.
238
 
When presented with this report, Hun Sen, who was now the leader of the 
government, changed his stance for an international tribunal and rejected it. There are those 
who claim that Hun Sen and his government‘s request for help with bringing the Khmer 
Rouge to justice was a mere strategy to gain political control and military dominance. 
Supporting this is the his sudden change of heart after a series of events; Nuon Chea (Brother 
no. 2 and President of Democratic Kampuchea People‘s Representative Assembly) and Khieu 
Samphan (President of the Democratic Kampuchea State Presidium) renounced the Khmer 
Rouge and accepted the authority of RGC as the true government of Cambodia in 1998; Ta 
Mok a.k.a. ―The Butcher‖ (the last one of the Khmer Rouge making military resistance) was 
captured in 1999 after which the rest of the Khmer Rouge cadres gave up and acknowledged 
the RGC; Kang Khev Iev a.k.a Duch (former head of Tuol Sleng prison) was also arrested in 
1999. Thus, the Khmer Rouge threat was removed as was Hun Sen‘s need for international 
assistance of bringing these people to justice. Hun Sen disguised his strategy, according to 
scholars, using the argument of national reconciliation for not creating an ad hoc tribunal, 
holding that brining Khmer Rouge cadres before a court might cause panic and disrupt the 
peace and development in the Cambodian society.
239
 
After Hun Sen‘s rejection of both an ad hoc international tribunal and a truth 
commission followed years of negotiations. Hun Sen now wanted domestic trials or domestic 
judges, but not a strictly international tribunal.
240
 He wanted to try Ta Mok in domestic courts, 
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while the international community opposed it, holding that domestic standards of justice 
would not be able to be met without international help. The broad international interest 
pressed for Cambodia to keep negotiating with the international community, and some 
governments supported Cambodian involvement in the legal process, as long as international 
standards of justice could be ensured. After meeting with Senator John Kerry, Hun Sen 
ultimately agreed to his suggestion of a domestic court with the participation of foreign 
judges.
241
  
The subsequent negotiations were about whether the applicable law should be 
domestic, international or both, procedural questions about standards of justice, organizational 
questions and funding. Legal experts from both the UN and the Cambodian government came 
together in a collaboration to enable legislation on the questions at issue. However, the two 
sides could agree on hardly anything, making negotiations very difficult. After months of 
negotiations, the UN legal team presented to the Cambodian government a draft of articles on 
how the two sides should be governed in relation to the tribunal, stating that there must not be 
any substantially different alterations to the articles.
 242
  
When the ECCC Law was passed in January 2001 by Cambodia‘s National Assembly, 
many of the amendments that the UN had made in the articles of cooperation were not 
included. After many letters between the Cambodian government and the UN, the Cambodian 
stance would not budge.
243
 This resulted in the UN withdrawing from the negotiations in 
2002, holding that the Cambodian government was not committed enough to the process and 
contending that there was no way to guarantee independence, impartiality and objectivity in a 
tribunal.
244
 Kofi Annan stated that he would not resume negotiations unless he got a clear 
mandate from the General Assembly, leaving it for other Member States and Cambodia to 
pursue the matter.
245
 The GA mandate came in the end of 2002, after those interested had held 
a few meetings, bringing the UN back to the table.
246
 In 2003, a modified draft agreement was 
signed establishing the tribunal. The Cambodian government adopted it in 2004, alongside 
with amendments to the 2001 ECCC law as official legislation.
247
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The funding started in 2005 and by April, the contributing countries had donated 
enough to cover the international portion required. And so, after UN declared that the 
requirements on their side were complied with, came the entry into force of the Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes committed during the period of Democratic 
Kampuchea.
248
  
 
6.3 The Result of the Negotiations: the ECCC, and its Structure  
The product of the negotiations is a hybrid tribunal, which means that it is a tribunal with both 
domestic and international elements.
249
 It is placed within the Cambodian legal system and 
the effect of this ―mixed tribunal‖ structure on the substantive scope is that both domestic and 
international law will be used and thus both domestic and international crimes adjudicated. 
Since the ECCC is viewed as part of the Cambodian judicial system, the typical rule of 
primacy over national courts for international ad hoc tribunals does not apply like it does for 
the ICTY or ICTR; ergo the ECCC is not seen as being above the Cambodian courts.
250
 
The tribunal may adjudicate genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, 
religious persecution, homicide, destruction of cultural property and offenses against 
diplomatically protected people.
251
 The jurisdiction is limited to only trying the Khmer 
Rouge‘s ―senior leaders‖ that were ―most responsible for serious violations of Cambodian and 
international law‖ that were committed under their regime between April 17, 1975 and 
January 6, 1979. There set limit for how many defendants can be tried is five, the goal is thus 
to only try a small number of the most high-ranking and other powerful defendants. This is 
something that the Cambodian government opted for; this way the impact of the ECCC will 
not be too high on the Cambodian society for the sake of national reconciliation. Although, 
critics have pointed out that they pushed for this option because of the fact that many former 
Khmer Rouge cadres are now in the CPP-government, Hun Sen himself being one of them.
252
   
The tribunal is made up by two chambers; the Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court 
Chamber. It is consisted by both Cambodian and international judges. The Trial Chamber has 
four Cambodian judges and three international, while the Supreme Court Chamber has five 
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Cambodian judges and four international. There is also the Pre-Trial Chamber with three 
Cambodian judges and two international.
253
 Thus, the Cambodian judges are always in the 
majority, but supermajority is required for a decision. This hinders Cambodian control over 
the votes and ensures that there will always be at least one international judge supporting the 
decision. The Cambodian Supreme Council of Magistracy has the appointment power, 
appointing both the Cambodian judges and the UN Secretary-General nominated ones. The 
prosecutorial responsibility is in accordance to the inquisitorial model, but modified and 
divided between two co-prosecutors, one Cambodian and one international, as well as on two 
Investigating Judges, also mixed. Their decisions should be in consensus, but should they ever 
be in conflict, it will be resolved in the pre-trial chamber with a supermajority decision and 
without the ability to appeal.
254
  
 
6.4 Critiques and Potential Problems with the ECCC 
Ciorciari points out that many critics see the ECCC as a defeat for international standards of 
justice, fairness and due process. Though the UN tried hard to maintain its position during the 
negotiations, critics see the outcome as a defeat to the Cambodian government. Ciorciari 
contends that the outcome is more along line with the Cambodian government‘s interests then 
UN‘s when it comes to political issues such as jurisdiction of the court, structure and 
personnel. The compromises made by the international community have lead to the 
establishment of a flawed tribunal that accentuates Cambodian interests more than 
anything.
255
  
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan himself has expressed the problem of the 
executive in Cambodia interfering with the judiciary and the weakness of it questioning its 
credibility.
256
 Linton also believes that the ECCC resting on the Cambodian legal system does 
allow for the government to exert political influence over the tribunal.
257
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6.4.1 Political Interference and Bias 
Even if ECCC is a mixed tribunal, the dominance within the structure is clearly Cambodian. 
One of the critiques, or rather fears, is that the CPP will therefore have power to influence the 
Cambodian staff, since the tribunal is under the Cambodian legal system which in turn is 
characterized by political interference and corruption.
258
 Critics hold that the Cambodian 
judiciary is very much controlled by the executive branch, and consequently Hun Sen. It is 
held that the ECCC decisions will be biased by politics and not justified with law. This is also 
why many critics hold that the ECCC is a defeat for international standards of justice.
259
 
Roper and Barria hold that the tribunal is seen with suspicious eyes by all levels of the 
Cambodian society because of the fact that it took so many years just to establish it and that 
the establishment was characterized by the CPP lead government making the negotiations 
rather difficult.
260
  
The issue of the number of defendants in the ECCC is seen as a problem per se,
261
 but 
Hun Sen making statements about this is seen as him trying to politically interfere with the 
judicial process. It is well-known that Hun Sen has made public statements about not wanting 
more suspects being tried in the tribunal. This is something that worries and upsets many 
critics, which hold that he is trying to affect the Cambodian staff with his public comments. 
Brad Adams, the Asia director at HRW has said: "Hun Sen has no role in this court, yet he 
keeps trying to use his hold over its Cambodian personnel to interfere". He argues that 
prosecution of a few more suspects hardly can jeopardize peace in Cambodia and sees Hun 
Sen‘s statements as distrustful and as an attempt to manipulate the judicial process.262 
Connecting to this issue, the most senior international judge at the ECCC, Silvia Cartwright, 
said: ―[…] Comments, politically motivated or otherwise, which appear to be an attempt to 
interfere with that independence are therefore to be deplored."
263
  
Foreseeing a potential problem with political interference, the international side made 
sure there was a mechanism that would be able to address it, when negotiating the Agreement 
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on the establishment of the ECCC. The mechanism that the Agreement provides for, for 
allegations of political interference and such, OSJI holds, is not very effective. A safeguard 
for ―disagreements‖ between the prosecutors or the investigating judges is built in; however 
for the safeguards to work, the international senior staff needs to respond to allegations 
rapidly and invoke the safeguards proactively. And once invoked, the process needs to be 
quickly mobilized among the international staff handling these issues, since it can easily be 
protracted and complicated by the Cambodian staff, OSJI holds.
264
  
However, judges and prosecutors are not the only ones that are provided with 
safeguards. Another mechanism of dealing with potential impartiality is the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. Regarding disqualification of judges, any party may file such applications. This is 
stated in the ECCC Internal Rule 34.2: ―Any party may file an application for disqualification 
of a judge in any case in which the Judge has a personal or financial interest or concerning 
which the Judge has, or has had, any association which objectively might affect his or her 
impartiality, or objectively give rise to the appearance of bias‖. But even so, the question of 
bias and partiality still exists. 
 The Defense of Nuon Chea made use of the aforementioned right and filed an 
application for disqualification of the Cambodian judge Ney Thol. They claimed that the 
Judge is biased because of 1) having had a position as an officer in the RCAF, 2) having made 
decisions in favor of the CPP and 3) being a member of the CPP central committee. ―In other 
words, Judge Ney‘s position as a serving military officer and his participation in highly 
questionable judicial decisions ‗would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to 
reasonably apprehend bias‘ against Mr. Nuon and the Khmer Rouge in favor of the CPP‖.265  
The circumstances are such that Judge Ney remains an RCAF officer. The decisions 
referred to are his involvement in the convictions of Prince Ranariddh, the law maker Cheam 
Channy of the Sam Rainsy Party (both decisions suspected of being an attack by the CPP on 
the opposition) and finally the decision to keep Duch detained in over eight years. The 
                                                          
264
 Open Society Justice Initiative, ―Recent Developments in the Extraordinary Chambers if the Courts of 
Cambodia, August 2009 Update‖, p. 4-6, available at: 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publications/eccc_20090
817/eccc_20090817.pdf  20 October 2009 
265
Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/PTC (PTC, Jan. 28, 2008), ”Public decision on the Co-lawyers’ urgent 
application for disqualification of judge Ney Thol” available at: 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/32/PTC_disqualification_ney_thol_C11_29_EN.pdf  
November 04 2009 
55 
 
membership in the CPP central committee was however resigned with the appointment to the 
ECCC.
 266
 
The PTC argued in accordance to the bias test in Furundzija and the response was as 
following. There is a presumption of judges‘ impartiality and the threshold of proving bias is 
set high.
267
 This is derived from judges‘ oath to office and the qualifications by which they are 
appointed. This is something that has great weight in the ECCC and is equally applied to all 
the judges.
268
  
The PTC goes on by stating that military and personal capacity can be separated, and 
thus Judge Ney serves the ECCC in his personal capacity and not his military.
269
 Furthermore, 
the mere membership of a political party does not mean that the Judge‘s decisions were 
politically motivated or influenced. The Judge‘s oath of office assumes that he or she will do 
the work impartially, free from personal beliefs.
270
 Additionally, the PTC points to the fact 
that Judge Ney resigned his membership of the CPP central committee.
271
 What is more, the 
PTC observes, is that Nuon Chea was not connected to any of the cases brought up in this 
application. The Chamber thus concluded that the high threshold of evidence was not reached 
to show that Judge Ney is acting upon instruction or is politically motivated. ―There could be 
no such apprehension of bias by an objective observer informed of all relevant circumstances 
of the matters put before the Pre-Trial Chamber‖.272 
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This decision has been questioned in the DC-Cam magazine Searching For the Truth, 
where the writer holds that the circumstances together makes an apprehension of objective 
appearance of bias reasonable.
273
 He finds the decision unreasonable and holds: ―As it is, 
critics could say that the decision reached was not one based on the weight of the 
circumstances, but the weight of political considerations this situation invoked.‖ He suggests 
that this decision had something to do with the situation that a disqualification of the Judge 
might have lead to a flood of applications for disqualifications of the other Cambodian judges 
in the ECCC.
274
 He puts the bias issue in context with the judges also being a part of the 
Cambodian society, where they also might have experienced the terror of the Khmer Rouge or 
have had relatives that perished during their regime.
275
  
On the other hand, in the case of judge Ney, an indication against bias and partiality is 
that Judge Ney actually recused himself from the Duch case, probably due to his involvement 
in the aforementioned detention of Duch, in accordance with Internal Rule 34(1) which counts 
different situations in which a Judge may recuse himself because of potential impartiality or 
bias.
276
 Ergo, bias is not a self-evident issue that, despite questionable circumstances, is easy 
to adjudicate.  
 
6.4.2 Corruption 
It is established that corruption and political interference affects the Cambodian judges‘ 
decisions; being underpaid, they often take bribes for the sake of deciding in favor of private 
interests; being pressured by or politically tied to the executive branch, they often make 
decisions that the government wants to see. What makes this system easier to sustain is that 
every part of the legal profession is part of it, even the lawyers and prosecutors.
277
 Reporter 
Amanda Pike informs that Judge Nil Nonn, formerly a judge in the Battambang Court and 
now a judge in the ECCC Trial Chamber, admitted in an interview in 2002 of having accepted 
bribes. This due to his low salary and, according to her diaries, only after trials.
278
 Worden 
therefore holds that it is difficult to escape having Cambodian staff on the ECCC that has not 
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been involved in such incidents in the past.
279
 Thus, corrupt judges in the ECCC are a 
possibility, as well as the government having interests in the outcome; since many in the CPP 
government have a past with being connected to the Khmer Rouge, they would potentially 
have a lot to lose from disclosure about what they did.
280
  
Allegations of corruption are something that the Cambodian judges in the ECCC have 
been accused of from the opening of the tribunal, something that has stolen focus from the 
trials and even lead to some donors withholding their donations for the Cambodian staff.
281
  
Allegations of kickbacks, i.e. Cambodian judges securing their positions at the tribunal by 
paying for it to government officials or paying agents for the purpose of securing them the 
positions at the tribunal, have been flourishing since the tribunal started its work. However, 
many of these allegations were made anonymously, and none were proven. They have been 
dismissed as unsubstantiated every time.
282
 Before the first trial (the trial of Duch), the 
international judge Silvia Cartwright announced that the allegations of corruption is one of the 
biggest issues that the tribunal has to face. Reportedly, she called for the court to undertake 
needed measurements to deal with the issue.
283
  
There have been many calls for the UN and the Cambodian government to address the 
question of corruption in the ECCC. AHRC and the Cambodian Center for Human Rights 
(CCHR) was one of those that released a joint statement saying that unless the question is 
addressed, corruption might end up being implicitly accepted. This would undermine the 
ECCC and accordingly strengthen impunity and political interference in Cambodia.
284
 And in 
extension, with the tribunal being within that system, perhaps affect its practices.   
Another problem that has occurred after corruption allegations is the lack of a 
corruption reporting mechanism, something that the UN has pressed for, while the Cambodian 
government seemingly is not doing much about the question. This has caused more 
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disagreement and distrust between the international and national side, the New York Times 
reports. Critics say that without a mechanism like this, it appears as if there is at least a 
passive support of the system.
285
  
In December 2008, the Cambodian government and the UN came to the conclusion 
that there existed a need to strengthen the anti-corruption measures in the ECCC.
286
 The initial 
plan for an anti-corruption mechanism at the ECCC, presented in a Joint Statement by Deputy 
Prime Minister and Chairman of the Royal Government Task Force on the Khmer Rouge Trials, 
H.E. Sok An and the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Peter Taksoe-
Jensen, was to have two parallel national and international mechanisms called the Ethics Monitors 
that would meet in frequent Joint Sessions and deal with reports of corruption. The number of 
staff in each mechanism would be equal as would their votes, and if no consensus could be 
reached on a recommended action, there would be a vote that required supermajority for a 
decision. The consequence of this structure would be that Cambodian staff would turn to the 
national mechanism while the international staff would turn to its respective mechanism.287  
The plan was highly criticized by the OSJI the day after the Joint Statement was released, 
particularly for the separation into a parallel national and international mechanism. According to 
them, the Cambodian government holds a veto over honest investigations of corruption 
allegations, and the proposed plan would therefore do nothing to change this. "A system where 
each side handles the complaints of its own staff has already been tried and shown not to 
work," said James A. Goldston. Moreover, they hold, the plan is defective in that it lacks a 
report system for allegations of corruption coming from outside of the ECCC.
288
  
Discussions about the plan went on between Sok An and Peter Taksoe-Jensen, and 
without an agreement yet being reached, Taksoe-Jensen released a statement in April 2009 
saying that UN‘s belief is that for the sake of credibility, ECCC staff should be able to 
approach any mechanism, national or international, with reports of corruption. Recognizing 
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the importance of addressing the issue, Taksoe-Jensen stated that UN will strengthen their 
own mechanism within the tribunal, and investigate reports of corruption, ―as appropriate‖, 
and forward all complaints to the Cambodian government.
289
 Though, without stating what 
appropriate is.  
Finally, on 12 August 2009, a UN Press Release declared that the UN and Cambodia 
had reached an agreement on establishing an Independent Counsellor at the ECCC to be 
available to all staff with any complaints. His task will be to review any complaints about 
human resources management in the entire ECCC administration, including complaints about 
corruption, and to be empowered to address it. Contrary to the initial plan, both national and 
international staff will be able to come forth to the office, with the security of confidentiality. 
Appointed to this position is Uth Chhorn, also the head of Cambodia‘s National Audit 
Authority (NAA).
290
 The NAA is independent by law, but has been reported to be politically 
influenced by the government, according to Global Integrity. The post of the Auditor General 
is elected by the National Assembly, in the writing moment dominated by the CPP.
291
 
Therefore his appointment has been questioned and critics say that the auditor general and 
ECCC‘s independent counsellor being one and the same takes away credibility from the 
position.
292
  
The US has been in the forefront brokering this agreement; a requirement for 
donations is the tribunal being free from corruption. The OSJI contends that even with the 
new agreement, more additions need to be made to fully ensure independence, impartiality 
and confidentiality for those coming forth with complaints etc., stressing the importance of 
donors pushing these issues forward. The OSJI holds that recent allegations of corruption 
brought by ECCC staff to the UN, which were never addressed, should be investigated by the 
Independent Counsellor and not left unaddressed. Like earlier, they illuminate the defect of 
the general public still not being able to bring concerns about corruption to the Independent 
Counsellor.
293
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The HRW 2009 World Report declares that political interference and corruption in the 
Cambodian staff in the tribunal is still a serious concern.
294
 And so, corruption still seems to 
be a very much urgent issue that needs to be resolved for the sake of the tribunal‘s credibility, 
independence and legitimacy.  
 
6.4.3 The Cambodian Staff  
Cassese holds that one of the rationales behind international judges being better suited for 
international tribunals is because they are chosen on the basis of their competence in the 
international law area while national judges are accustomed to ‗ordinary‘ crimes such as 
murder, theft, assault etc.
295
 Chandler points to the inexperience of the Cambodian judges to 
deal with these kinds of questions. Some international observers contended that the tribunal is 
not able to be independent because of the possibility of Hun Sen interfering and giving the 
Cambodian judges‘ instructions on how to deal with the cases.296 At the same time, Ratner et 
al. holds that one of the biggest problems that the Cambodian judiciary carries is the lack of 
qualified legal profession.
297
 It is still suffering from having lost almost its entire legal 
profession in the mass murders committed by the Khmer Rouge. 
 
6.4.4 Cambodian Laws 
It is asserted that Cambodian laws are not in a strong enough state of being the primary base 
of the tribunal‘s jurisdiction and procedure,298 and it is questioned if the Cambodian legal 
system has the strength to carry this extra burden.
299
 Ratner et al. asserts that the Cambodian 
legal system has not met any of the standards for a free and fair judiciary ever since the 
Cambodian civil war.
300
  
Moreover, the problem that arose during the negotiations regarding the UN Agreement 
not being coherent with the articles preceding the 2001 EC law was harmonized to some 
extent, however many inconsistencies still exist between the two. Since many procedural rules 
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are contradictory in Cambodian laws,
301
 and many inconsistencies are left unresolved or gaps 
left untouched between the UN Agreement, 2001 ECCC law and Cambodian law, the ECCC 
adopted internal rules that would fill out the gaps and resolve the uncertainties.
302
 But there 
are still many issues that are unclear.
303
 This means that if in conflict, the judges will have to 
decide which law will take precedence.
304
  
 
6.4.5 The Culture of Impunity and Lack of Trust 
The biggest problem in Cambodia is, according to Ratner et al., the lack of a culture that 
respects and believes in the judiciary to be impartial and fair. Simply put, people do not 
believe in the justice system.
305
 And since the Cambodians have a lack of faith for the 
Cambodian judiciary, because of the pervasive corruption, their faith in the ECCC is not 
overly enthusiastic.
306
  
The culture of impunity also produces a lack of faith towards the government, since 
many times they are the ones on the other end of the corrupt judiciary. McGraw stresses that 
many Cambodians do not trust their government and would have preferred a completely 
international tribunal. But, according to a number of surveys, she summarizes, most 
Cambodians prefer at least this international contribution in the tribunal than none at all, 
because they want to know the truth about why the atrocities were committed and by whom, 
and they do not believe that their government can give them that.
307
 The atrocities made by 
the Khmer Rouge have been largely repressed in Cambodia, for the sake of mixed interests; 
the government wanting to close the topic because of national reconciliation and the fact that 
many officials were tied to the DK regime; survivors wanting to move on and leave it in the 
past.
308
 However, Cambodians want to know the truth now. 
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6.4.6 The Number of Defendants  
A potential problem in the future is the question of how many defendants is enough. The 
agreement says ―[…] senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most 
responsible […]‖. The wording thus leaves it open for interpretation if it is only the senior 
leaders or also those most responsible.
309
 If it is the latter, then that would presumably 
increase the number of defendants, something that Hun Sen already has expressed much 
dislike over.
310
 The Group of Experts were of the opinion that all those ―most responsible‖ 
should be prosecuted, and the UN showed this intent as well during the negotiations. 
Conversely, the Cambodian government was of the opposite opinion and only wanted ―senior 
leaders‖ to be tried plus Duch (Kaing Guek Eav). But Duch was not a ―senior leader‖, nor was 
he high ranking in the Khmer Rouge regime. He was on the other hand the commander of the 
infamous S-21
311
 detention center (also known as the Tuol Sleng prison). And so, even if the 
Cambodian government wanted Duch to be tried, that decision to try him has to be supported 
by something; it has to be supported by the agreement. And thus, what supports the broader 
interpretation of the agreement is that Duch is actually the first defendant to be tried at the 
ECCC.  
Nevertheless, it seems that the UN and the Cambodian government have come to the 
conclusion to only try five to ten people. Something that the critics, the Cambodian people 
and even former King Sihanouk are not satisfied with. At the same time some people believe 
that if not restrained to only senior leaders and those most responsible, perpetrators will surely 
be found at all levels of society and in enormous numbers, shaking the peace and stability in 
the country, something that would also challenge the tribunal‘s limited resources. The exact 
scope of the agreement‘s wording is however up to the prosecutors and the ECCC to 
decide.
312
  
The controversy in this issue is reflected by disagreement between the two co-
prosecutors in the ECCC, BBC News reports; earlier this year the former international co-
prosecutor Robert Petit wanted to prosecute six more suspects, while the Cambodian co-
prosecutor Chea Leang rejected prosecution of more suspects with the stance of not wanting 
to jeopardize Cambodia‘s stability, rejecting the accusations of being under political 
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influence.
313
 This prosecutorial disagreement went to the Pre-Trial Chamber where it was 
decided that the International Co-prosecutor‘s three submissions are forwarded to the Co-
Investigating Judges to open judicial investigations.
314
 This was something that was highly 
unwelcomed by Hun Sen, claiming that it is a threat to Cambodia‘s peace. After this 
statement, Knut Rosandhaug, Coordinator of the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer 
Rouge trials declared that the ECCC is independent from the Cambodian government and do 
not need the executive branch‘s approval for their decisions.315 Nevertheless, Cambodian 
judges are being appointed by Cambodian officials and this issue might as well reoccur in the 
future.  
 
6.4.7 The Appointment Mechanism 
Like aforementioned, The Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM) is the body that appoints 
national judges. For the international judges, nominations are first made by the UN and 
appointment is then made in the SCM. The procedure for the appointment is the same as for 
the national judges, as stated in the Law establishing the ECCC. However, this procedure is a 
criticized one. Global integrity states that the national selection procedure lacks transparency 
and has been accused of being un-lawful.
316
 Officials from ECCC‘s administration office have 
stated that among the SCM‘s mandatory criteria when appointing Cambodian judges are the 
requirements of no political influence, pressures direct or indirect or criminal records.
317
 
However, in the report made by Global Integrity it is held that also this criterion is unclear, 
and that appointment of Cambodian judges many times is lead by political consideration.  
Independent by law both from the judiciary and government, with the power of 
appointment and the power of oversight of the judiciary, the SCM‘s practice is contrary to 
that it has been said.  ―No, the SCM is not protected by political interference‖,318 nor is it 
completely separated from politics; with the Minister of Justice being one of the members in 
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the SCM and the budget for SCM being integrated into the budget of the Ministry of Justice, 
political influence is ensured to at least some degree since he is also a member of the 
executive branch. And consequently, the SCM being the appointing body for the tribunal, 
Cambodian political influence is also ensured in the tribunal.
319
  
 
6.4.8 The Pre Trial Chamber as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
The Pre-Trial Chamber is supposed to dissolve disagreements between the co-prosecutors and 
co-investigating judges and that is, according to Worden, highly unorthodox since judges will 
then have a saying in the prosecutorial process, something that is not their area of competence 
and thus decreasing the judicial independence. Furthermore, it is not defined what 
disagreement means, i.e. whether it is any disagreement in the prosecutorial process or just the 
decision to indict or not. This politically charges the ECCC even more.
320
 Consequently, it 
has been feared that some questions will be resolved this way in the PTC that is not for those 
judges to make, i.e. the question on how many defendants the ECCC might prosecute, as 
shown above.
321
 
 
6.5 Hopes and Expectations for the ECCC 
For those who suffered under the Khmer Rouge regime, the justice of the tribunal will most 
likely be psychologically healing. And if, finally, accountability for the Khmer Rouge 
becomes a product of the tribunal, then that might restore the belief in societal norms and the 
legal system and thus challenge and reverse the culture of non-respect for the rule of law.
322
 
Ciorciari points to a DC-Cam survey that showed that many Cambodians find the moral 
condemnation of the past and the deterrent effect for the future to be very important.
323
  
The ECCC might also bring improvements to the Cambodian legal system, strengthen 
the rule of law and establish the notion that nobody is above the law, not even political 
leaders. The ECCC staff was trained and educated before the ECCC started operating. These 
judges will later on go back to their domestic courts and hopefully use this knowledge there, 
and break free from their habits and old practices. Especially because of the extensive media 
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coverage that the tribunal has gotten, and the world following the evolvement, there is a belief 
that the judiciary will conform to the international standards of justice. And if the tribunal is 
carried out in accordance to these standards, the national courts will have an example to 
follow that lies within their own system, which might help establishment the rule of law and 
restore people‘s belief in the judiciary.324  
It is established that Cambodians do not trust their judiciary and would have 
preferably seen an entirely international tribunal. However, Ciorciari stresses the fact that a 
survey conducted in 2004 showed that the majority would rather have trials conducted with 
the risk of possibly being in accordance to lower standards of justice than no trials at all.
325
 
Dr. Gregory H. Stanton defends the tribunal and holds that the approach to the ECCC should 
not be all-or-nothing, and that focusing on the details and expecting perfection could only lead 
to more negotiations, stall and hinder the prosecutions and ultimately be in the way of 
justice.
326
 Ciorciari is also positive to the tribunal, stating that the leaders of the DK regime 
are getting old, and for those advocating for the tribunal, it is more important to prosecute the 
suspects with perhaps an imperfect trial, then to not prosecute them at all because of perfect 
ideals and see justice never being served.
327
 
If there was no tribunal, it would be a setback for international law as well as the UN, 
letting the Khmer Rouge perpetrators get away unpunished, leaving the victims without 
justice, making the notion of impunity even stronger as well as hindering Cambodia‘s efforts 
to put the Khmer Rouge in the past.
328
  
 
7. An Analysis of the Legal Development and its effect on the ECCC 
 
As it has been put forth in this paper, the political environment in which the Cambodian legal 
system exists affects the practice of the rules. This is connected to the country‘s turbulent 
history: the political struggles for power before the KR-era, the KR-era eradicating all 
existing rules and societal norms, and the post KR-era with the struggle for stabilization, the 
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international involvement in national politics and thereby the implementation of values 
foreign to local practices. What impact this might have on the ECCC and in turn its practices 
is here analyzed through the international, social and legal lens. 
Cambodia is a hybrid regime with democratic values in tandem with traditional 
practices, including a mixed tribunal with both national and international features intertwined 
in its system. The public, NGOs, transnational networks and the ECCC‘s objectives of justice 
have had and still have great importance in this system. Furthermore, Cambodia was not a 
mature democracy when its cooperation with the UN started, nor has it reached that level of 
practice today. Nevertheless, the democratic framework was placed within this system which 
did not have a tradition of democracy or a strong rule of law. UNTAC was a result of 
negotiations with the international community, as was the ECCC. Thus, the legal 
development in Cambodia and the establishment of the ECCC has traditional, cultural, 
political, international and societal connotations that need to be observed and taken into 
account when analyzing this development.  
UNTAC and ECCC came into being thanks to international actors together with the 
Cambodian government, for that reason I apply the international relations constructivist 
theory. The norms and ideas that were presented to the Cambodian society did not coincide 
with the Cambodians‘ previous culture, tradition and identity, therefore I apply the social 
constructivist theory. The legal culture in Cambodia has since then nevertheless been 
changed, or at the very least affected, by the social change that was introduced with the new 
norms presented by the UNTAC and recently by the ECCC, for this reason I will apply 
sociology of law. 
 
7.1 An International Relations Constructivist Approach 
The focal point in constructivism is ideas and values. It is a social theory that explains norms 
and ideas changing through intellectual promoters‘ active persuasion and ultimately by human 
choices. These entrepreneurs are usually powerful individuals, NGOs and transnational 
activist networks.
329
 An example of a transnational activist network is Human Rights Watch. 
Their work is done by gathering information about violations of accepted legal or moral 
norms that have support in the international community, and then pressing governments to 
remedy these deviations. Their biggest power is that information-sharing tool about these 
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violations.
330
 Information causes the international community to react at the same time as it 
informs about international standards in any given society where these norms are violated. 
Through their persuasion of democratic and fair values and naming and shaming of other, new 
collective meanings are then constructed. This in turn shapes the state system which then 
structures and organizes our actions, be that positive or negative.
331
 The democracy in 
Cambodia was presented by UNTAC and the ECCC is a product of negotiations between the 
UN and the Cambodian government. To this extent, social constructivism of international 
relations applies to explain this development since this theory‘s starting-point is the relations 
between one state and other actors outside of the state, and how norms and ideas turn into 
practices and consequently shape the identity of a state; it explains here how democratic 
values can be introduced to a society and what it takes for the actors on different levels such 
as politicians and the people to internalize these norms and through their actions transform it 
into accepted practice.
332
 Wendt holds that all theories of international relations are based on 
social theories of the relationship between agency, process and social structure.
333
  
Wendt holds that some situations are new to our experience, which leads us to 
construct their meaning de novo,
334
 as could be seen after the KR-era when Cambodia had to 
build up its society from scratch. Wendt puts forth that consensus about identity commitments 
is the first stage in transformation.
335
 When the Peace Accords took place in 1989, one can 
say that Cambodia needed an international transformation. Years of human rights atrocities 
had gone by without adjudication of them. Many NGOs were highlighting this issue, as well 
did the country itself. The warring factions, together with the traumatized public, wanted to 
separate KR from themselves and the governance of Cambodia. Corruption and patronage 
politics were raging and one can discuss if the people felt the notion of justice in their 
everyday lives. In addition, KR had under their era made sure that the country was cut off 
from the international world, and restoring this during the Vietnam War and Cold war politics 
was difficult. But as time went by, Cambodia‘s government saw the importance of 
international integration and together with the international community pushing for 
international norms and values on the government, a consensus was reached on a peace 
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between the warring factions and a new democratic system: the framework presented by 
UNTAC.  
The second stage, Wendt states, is a ―critical examination of old ideas about self and 
other and, by extension, of the structures of interaction by which the ideas have been 
sustained‖.336 Applying this to the Cambodian system, one can see that it has been sustained 
by patron-client relationships, corruption and political violence, something that made the 
institutions rather dysfunctional and unfair, the electoral system being a clear example as was 
shown earlier. Those who had connections and money could so bypass the rules of law. If one 
wanted to get things done, this was the way to do it. And so, even in citizens‘ everyday lives, 
this was the way to get things done. Money and power trumped the rules of law. This in turn 
sustained the system. Thus, critiquing the ideas that sustained this structure and comparing to 
other lead to the formation of a new democratic system. Much thanks to transnational 
networks and UN, this critique could be presented and pushed forward into action. 
However, ever since UNTAC left, Cambodia‘s governance has been one of 
―hybridity‖: at the same time as its patronage politics and corrupt legal system has given its 
rulers power, so has the somewhat newly constituted democratic institutions. This dual 
existence can be said to be two identities. This leads us to stage three; Wendt declares that the 
final and third stage in international transformation requires practice. This is the ―core of 
constructivist resolutions of the agent-structure problem‖.337 ―In order to change the self, then, 
it is often necessary to change the identities and interests of the others that help sustain those 
systems of interaction‖.338 Seeing as the Cambodian government was the transformative agent 
together with the UN, at the same time as it was the sustaining agent of the traditional norms, 
the issue of identity becomes intricate. Simultaneously as the Cambodian government was 
working for new ideas and implementing them in the Cambodian society, they were also 
sustaining the old ones; seemingly, new democratic ideas were developed parallel with the 
notion of patronage and corruption still being valuable for the governing body. And so, the 
Cambodian government and its society can be said to have (at least) two identities, whereof 
the traditional needs to change in order to internalize the democratic norms. For the new 
democratic identity in Cambodia to become effective, actors thus need to change their ways. 
Identities and interests hold a key role in the theory of constructivism. A state may have 
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numerous identities linked to its institutional roles. Which identity will take precedence 
depends on how others see the state and how the state sees itself. And how the state sees itself 
depends on which interests it has.
339
 Does the Cambodian government subsequently have an 
interest in ceasing the practices of the traditional structure? This is weighed against the 
interest of getting international recognition of being democratic and fair and the benefits that 
come with it. As an example, more and more industrial countries demand at least some level 
of democracy and respect for human rights when it comes to trading.
340
 In cases where the 
disregard of these was high, even economic sanctions were imposed, such as the UN financial 
and trade embargo against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait.
341
 That being an extreme 
example, the trend in today‘s international community is a demand for respect for these 
values. In the case of Cambodia, corruption makes international trade more difficult since it 
introduces the issue of trust and suspicion. Thus, recognition as a democratic state would 
make relations with other actors outside of the Cambodian state easier. 
 
7.2 A Social Constructivist Approach 
The social world is a dynamic reality, influenced and changed by human thoughts and ideas. 
Accordingly, any given society does not exist in a vacuum; it is not a static phenomenon free 
from internal and external influence. A society is because of its people, its politics, its 
economics and the structures they make up.
342
 Everything in our human societies is also made 
by us, be that relationships or political structures. The driving force behind all kinds of 
relations is thoughts and ideas. Because of the fact that we create our world, we can also 
understand our world. ―The social world is a world of human consciousness‖, Jackson 
holds.
343
 Hence, laws, norms and structures are not something carved in stone; they are 
constantly interpreted through people‘s choices and thus constructed through social dynamic 
processes. Reality is then a social construction.
344
 
In order to change the identity of impunity, corruption and patronage in Cambodia, the 
practices of the aforementioned need to end. In order for the democratic norms to get a 
foothold in the Cambodian society, actors need to start acting upon them. However, 
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interactions must be regular enough for them to become a new practice and a new identity. 
Politicians, the judiciary and the people are all actors that constitute their own society over 
and over again. Accordingly, all actors in a society are important and involved when it comes 
to change. Not to forget, change needs to be desired.  
In Cambodia, there seems to be an internal interest to keep the traditional system alive, 
given that it strengthens the leaders‘ power grip and ensures a continuation of it. The CPP‘s 
political history demonstrates this well. Hun Sen‘s position as a leader of the country has not 
always been constituted in a democratic manner, the elections of 1993 being an example of 
that where the CPP was the runner up, but still refused to give its power up. Another matter 
that one notices is the importance of the patrons providing financial support for the country‘s 
development. Like aforementioned, Hun Sen has affirmed that he gets donations for e.g. the 
building of new schools and new roads. Allegedly, this is returned with political favors. My 
research shows that much of the country‘s governance is done this way, through patronage 
and corruption. Hence, there are still interactions between the government and the rich and 
powerful that help sustain this traditional system. Simply put, there lays an interest in not 
changing it.  
Simultaneously however, the Cambodian people have expressed discontent with this 
system, even if they many times have to conform to the circumstances that govern their 
country. People might believe one thing, but have no choice but to conform to the ideas 
offered in their society, such as correct themselves in accordance with the decisions made by 
the judiciary or vote for CPP, when faced with the threat of violence. Such interactions are a 
part of socialization; the people do not exist in a vacuum. The people follow the identity of 
their culture, their history. Like showed earlier, the Cambodian people have both a religion 
and history of subordinating themselves to the leaders of their country.
345
 Their identities 
create structures that produce institutions. The institutions are usually expounded in formal 
rules or norms. However, institutions cannot exist without actors‘ knowledge of them; they 
exist because there are ideas behind them.
346
 But institutions are not empty shells or mere 
cognition. They are an internalization of ideas and socialization. In other words, both thought 
and practice is needed to constitute an identity of a functional institution.
347
 
                                                          
345
 See section 4.2 para. 2 
346
 Jackson, p. 166 
347
 Op.cit. 
71 
 
In Cambodia‘s case, it has been showed that the judiciary is working along the line of 
the Cambodian government and their ideas. Accordingly, democratic ideas might be 
expressed in a document such as the constitution, but this shows that words are not enough for 
action when political power and direction of action plays a bigger role. Even though the 
judiciary is supposed to be impartial, it will not become that just by the mere words in the 
constitution. If the political power does not allow for impartiality, at least internally and 
behind the curtains, this will not happen. This is because the legal system in Cambodia is very 
much controlled by the government. The judiciary, being dependent on the government, will 
then sustain this identity and keep the traditional norms alive, albeit supposedly democratic. 
This is much thanks to the fact that the democratic system which was introduced and the 
constitution that followed as a product of it, was presented by the outside world. And so, with 
the guidance of aftermath one can see that the Cambodian government was not truly willing to 
adjust to it. Nor was it capable of it. Nevertheless, it set the wheels of change in motion.  
 
Eventually change brought about the ECCC with which the notion of impunity of the Khmer 
Rouge was partially reduced. One must understand that the ECCC is an institution that has 
extensive work and ideas behind it from the Cambodian government as well as powerful 
intellectuals, NGOs and transnational activist networks. It is also an institution that has just 
recently begun its practices.
348
 But the question is if the ideas and values are adequately 
internalized. Allegations of corruption and political interference suggest that they might not 
be, blurring the identity of being a democratic and fair institution. On the other hand, no such 
case of corruption and political interference has to date been proven in the ECCC. Instead, 
what is visual is the ECCC working hard on reaffirming the values behind the institution as 
well as NGOs and networks actively working on holding the Cambodian government 
responsible for the ideas that they have committed themselves to, both in their constitution as 
well as the ECCC. Additionally, the work in the Chambers that has been done so far has been 
in accordance with the rules stipulated for the institution. Accordingly, the decisions made in 
the ECCC are not necessarily unfair. But, an identity cannot exist in an institutional void. 
External perception is equally important, for it is reproducing.  
The precarious feature about ECCC is that it has its own identity at the same time as it 
is a part of Cambodia‘s system‘s identity, being an integrated part of it. And so, even if the 
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tribunal‘s establishment was guided by international values and might have a relatively stable 
identity of international standards of justice, the Cambodian government does not. Because 
these identities are intertwined in a bigger picture of the Cambodian system, perception of it 
affects the tribunal as well. The international community does not see Cambodia as an entirely 
democratic state yet, and neither does its people. Au contraire, Cambodia‘s system as well as 
its judiciary is seen as corrupt and politically influenced. Given that Cambodian judges sit in 
the ECCC, these perceptions follow them into the tribunal where this identity is reproduced. 
Consequently, this affects the practices of the ECCC being within the Cambodian legal 
system, which on the one hand have to deal with the surrounding world‘s disbeliefs and on 
the other hand have to deal with potentially having corruption within the Chambers.  
Nevertheless, the ECCC is a mixed court, with international judges and staff as well, 
and thereby actors that internalize and socialize the international standards of justice too, 
creating an identity of fairness. And as much as the ECCC is affected by Cambodian 
traditional values, it is equally, if not more, affected by international values. It has the 
international community watching over its practices, it has NGOs and transnational networks 
informing of deviations from accepted norms, and consequently it has the benefit of being in 
the spotlight. One should not underestimate the power of ―naming and shaming‖. This makes 
it likely that the ECCC might be able to change the traditional norms in Cambodia, since its 
judges will go back to their national judiciary and hopefully continue the practices of the 
international standards of justice.  
Ultimately, the persuasion of ideas in the ECCC come from both national and 
international directions, with the benefit actually being the Court‘s mixed character having the 
UN watching over it, as well as the rest of the world.   
 
7.3 A Sociology of Law Approach 
The sociology of law cannot be explained with one objective definition since there are a vast 
number of scholars using various definitions. However, Griffiths explains it well when he 
says ―Sociology of law is the empirical social science whose object is social control‖.349 
Naturally, some common ground is also to be found: When talking about sociology of law, 
Friedman holds, one cannot be serious without taking into consideration social, cultural, 
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economic and political influences.
350
 Friedman‘s theory is that the society has a powerful 
influence on the legal system and forms it in accordance with its own societal factors.
351
 He 
puts it very well when he says that the rules and norms in a society‘s legal order do not say 
anything about the effects of them in the society. For this, one needs to look into the larger 
society to trace eventual effects.
352
 Thus, to see if the norms in Cambodia‘s constitution affect 
the legal system, one must look at the legal practices and what is upholding them. Likewise, 
one must look at the practices of the ECCC to see if the norms and ideas behind it are being 
internalized as stated prior to the opening of the tribunal. In conclusion, reality is socially 
constructed.
353
 Consequently, when applying this science, one focuses on social control, 
influences, effects and changes.  
When Ehrlich speaks about law and the proliferation of it, he contends that there is no 
such thing as a state law existing merely through a regulation. A law exists because the state 
has created institutions through which enforcement is made possible because of the state‘s 
power of compulsion.
354
 Similar to this, Habermas concludes that the existence of individual 
rights depends on the rights being concretely delineated and shaped in terms of basic rights 
that are connected to an independent judiciary where the judges will make their decisions on 
impartial grounds. He thus presupposes that the power to decide stems from the sanctioning 
power of the state and its organizational capacity.
355
  As a result, he connects the function of 
law to political power: it is because of political power that decisions are binding.
356
  
Applied to Cambodia, the country has indeed delineated rights stated in terms of a 
constitution, basic rights, human rights, all rights needed in a democratic society. However, 
the judiciary is not impartial. But this impartiality is not independent of the state, even the 
impartiality is thus derived from the sanctioning power of the state, seeing as the judges many 
times make their decisions in accordance with political direction and orders, political bias and 
corruption. And so, regardless of what rights are stated in legal documents, their 
implementation will be done by biased judges. Thus, using Ehrlich‘s definition, the law does 
indeed exist because of the state‘s power to compel. However, using Habermas definition, it is 
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questionable if one can say that there exists such a thing as individual rights in Cambodia 
seeing as the impartiality condition does not exist in practice.   
On the other hand, ECCC must be differentiated from the Cambodian judiciary, even if 
the tribunal lies within its system. This is because there lays an enormous political pressure 
behind the ECCC, both on the national and international level. The government has to show 
its people that it is willing to put those most responsible for the KR atrocities behind bars at 
the same time as the international world is observing the ECCC practices, with an obvious 
interest in keeping the tribunal neutral and fair seeing as it is partially representative of the 
UN given the international judges in it. Moreover it is evident that the international 
community wants to see people prosecuted for the crimes against humanity in accordance 
with international norms, as well as the Cambodian people are crying out for truth and justice. 
The establishment of the ECCC was made through lengthy reciprocal interactions between the 
Cambodian government and the international community. The discussions around it all 
concerned democratic values and international standards of justice. The practices of the 
ECCC are according to the law establishing it, democratic and fair. And even with the 
allegations of corruption circling the ECCC, the push for democratic ideas and fair norms has 
been constant. One can then say that interactions connected to this have undoubtedly been 
regular and high. This establishes a political power which then makes sure that the 
enforcement mechanism in the ECCC has bearing and gives the ideas, norms and rules 
creating the ECCC force and makes sure that they are not merely words.  
 
An important element of the sociology of law is social change. The new democratic 
framework by UNTAC and the constitution that came with was an obvious attempt to bring 
about change in the legal and social order in Cambodia. But for law to work as an instrument 
of social change, two processes need to be realized: institutionalization and internalization of 
patterns and behavior. For this to happen, a strong enforcement mechanism is needed. 
Alongside, however, certain conditions need to be fulfilled. Vago cites William M. Evan and 
counts the seven suggested conditions which need to be fulfilled for law to bring about social 
change. One of the conditions is that the values presented must be compatible with the 
existing ones.
357
 Applying this to Cambodia, we have already seen that the values presented 
with the UNTAC democracy were not correspondent with the values in the Cambodian 
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society at that time, or perhaps even today. Another condition is that those enforcing the law 
must themselves be very much committed to the change intended by the law.
358
 Enforcement 
in Cambodia is partially made by the government who is flawed with patronage and 
corruption, and furthermore by the biased and corrupt judiciary. Now, given those facts, we 
realize that those enforcing the law in Cambodia are probably not committed to the change 
their constitution provided when it was enacted. Instead of being interested in the democratic 
rules, the judiciary was (is?) interested in whatever gives them the most personal gain. This is 
the legal culture in Cambodia. 
Yet again, we have to differentiate the ECCC from this legal culture. Keeping in mind 
that the ECCC is not an independent institution separated from the Cambodian system, and 
keeping in mind that it was showed earlier in this thesis that the Cambodian legal culture 
cannot be separated from the Cambodian judges when they assume the position of an ECCC 
official, we must however note the different ideas and driving forces behind the ECCC 
comparing to the Cambodian judiciary. The discussion about law and individual rights can 
sometimes be somewhat metaphysical since behind it are ideas about the compelling power of 
a state, enforcement mechanisms, political power and philosophical ideas. The discussion 
about the ECCC however relates directly to something that the Cambodian society has 
experienced. Because behind the ECCC lies a factual historical happening, the atrocities by 
the KR.  
Accordingly, the ECCC can nevertheless work as a legal instrument for social change. 
One of the differences between the tribunal and the Cambodian judiciary is that the legal 
enforcement mechanism is stronger. Comparing to the Cambodian judiciary it has more 
transparency, a review and pressure by the international community as well as pressure by its 
people. The existence of the ECCC and the value that it presents does indeed coincide with 
the existing ones in the Cambodian society since people want justice for what was done 
between 1975-1979 by the Khmer Rouge. Additionally the government is interested in the 
ECCC working in accordance to protocol because of the pressure by the people and because 
of the pressure by the international community. And even if there is some resistance and 
attempt to influence, the interest still exists. The tribunal could not have existed without the 
acceptance and desire by the Cambodian government. Simultaneously, there are the 
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international judges in the tribunal which are presumed to guarantee that the practices in the 
ECCC stay neutral and uninfluenced by the traditional Cambodian practices.  
Going back to Ehrlich, he contends that there is a difference between statutes and 
norms. Statutes only create state institutions, they do not create norms per se. Society does, 
and through time this is interpreted in ―Legal Provisions‖, as he refers to it. Afterthought thus 
creates the norms stated in law, i.e. after we have already experienced the norms in society, 
we expound them in legal provisions.
359
 But these norms only exist as long as the 
preconditions for them in society exist. When society changes, and it does constantly, norms 
change. The social order is transformable: new conditions give new interests, which leads to 
new conflicts that in turn lead to new decisions and result in new legal provisions. And again, 
afterthought plays its role in the changing of a society.
360
 This would explain the creation of 
the ECCC. It has definitely taken some afterthought to create an institution that can adjudicate 
the atrocities perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge. After the Khmer Rouge changed the 
Cambodian society, a change was needed yet again after they were defeated. However, even 
with the PRK take-over and the defeat of the KR, they did not leave the Cambodian scene but 
continued to struggle for power. Naturally, this affected the Cambodian society. And in 
addition to the KR, there was an internal struggle for power between the then warring 
factions. All of this scarred the Cambodian society, hampered development and stabilization. 
And thus social change was slow. But when things somewhat changed and stabilized, and the 
cry for adjudication of the KR became loud enough and obvious enough it was time to ―set 
the legislative machinery into motion,‖361 as Ehrlich says.  
A legal culture is transformed by social change, according to Friedman. The legal 
culture is ―what people think about the law, lawyers and legal orders; it means ideas, attitudes, 
opinions and expectations with regard to the legal system‖. And then something happens in 
the society that changes it, e.g. a revolution. This does not change the legal order 
automatically or immediately, but does spin the wheel and the motion towards legal change 
starts slowly. When this happens, people‘s attitudes and expectations change, and they 
formulate new demands that in turn leads to legal change. ―Legal culture translates social 
change into legal change‖, as he puts it.362 The Cambodian society experienced political 
instability and violence during a long time, and then the Paris Peace Accords happened. This 
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brought about a new political system and a new constitution. But just like Friedman says, it 
did not change the Cambodian system immediately. However, in due time, people started to 
know their rights. And even though they did not and still might not believe in the constitution, 
they would like it to be true and hope it to be true some day. Cambodians now want 
democracy, they want their rights to be recognized and they want to know the truth. This can 
be demonstrated by Cambodian human rights NGOs such as LICHADO as well as by the 
mere existence of the ECCC. Thus, the people‘s expectations have changed, something that 
surely has changed the legal order. And accordingly, the ECCC exists because the Cambodian 
society has changed into one that demands justice to be served as regards to the KR atrocities.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
The ECCC‘s credibility being within Cambodia‘s politically influenced and corrupt system is 
highly critiqued. So what does it mean that the ECCC is resting on the Cambodian legal 
system that is shown to be affected by the country‘s politics? It means that the system allows 
for the possibility of the Cambodian government to exert political influence over the 
tribunal,
363
 just like it does with its own judiciary. If judges are politically tainted, so might 
their decisions be. In extension, that would affect the tribunal‘s practices.  
 In the courts of Cambodia, it is established that corruption, bribery and political 
interference affects the Cambodian judges‘ decisions.364 The ECCC is a mixed tribunal with 
international staff, but the dominance within the structure is Cambodian. Because of this, the 
chances for political influence are even higher.
365
 It is therefore held that the ECCC decisions 
will be biased by politics and not justified with law.
366
  
There are laws establishing the ECCC and governing the relationship between the 
Cambodian government and the UN, and there are internal rules interpreting what was left 
unresolved but there are still issues that are unclear.
367
 When a conflict thus arises, it will be 
up to the judges to interpret.
368
 This is something that could obviously affect the ECCC 
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practices. Regardless of the issue, and regardless of whether it is international or Cambodian 
judges in the majority, interpretations set precedents. And let us imagine the issue being a 
political one and the Cambodian judges being in the majority, and them being corrupt or 
politically influenced - it takes convincing one international judge to get supermajority and 
thus setting a precedent that is politically favorable to the government of Cambodia. However, 
this is a hypothesis that assumes that the international judges are convincible. Although they 
too are human, in reality international judges are trained to be independent, objective and 
impartial and they are experienced with the kind of questions that are adjudicated in the 
tribunal. This is opposite of the Cambodian judges. Ergo, one can assume the possibility but 
question the probability.  
So far, we have seen the international judges being steadfast in their opinions, as have 
the Cambodian. An example where these two sides have been polarized in a politically 
sensitive case is the aforementioned disagreement between the former international co-
prosecutor Robert Petit and Cambodian co-prosecutor Chea Leang regarding more suspects in 
the tribunal is an example.
369
 The PTC‘s stance was this: the three Cambodian judges were 
against more submissions to the co-investigating judges to open judicial opinions, while the 
two international were for. And since the rules
370
 are such that if there is not an affirmative 
vote of four judges (supermajority) to block the submissions, the action of the International 
co-prosecutor will be executed.
371
 Whether it is just a circumstance that the sides were divided 
into one international and one Cambodian, one can only speculate. It does however leave 
room for questioning. But even in those cases where the Cambodian judges are not able to 
exert political influence on the decisions, they could, the way I see it, affect the practices by 
delaying the process this way.  
A condition for political influence in the ECCC is that the judges actually are biased. I 
do not believe it is enough to say that the Cambodian legal system, on which the ECCC rests, 
is corrupt and politically influenced. There needs to be some actual correlation to the ECCC. I 
believe that the appointment mechanism is such a correlation. The Minister of Justice who is s 
part of the Council of Ministers, which is dominated by the CPP, also holds a seat at the 
                                                          
369
 Supra at section 6.4.6 para. 3 
370
 See Internal Rule 71(2) and 74(1), available at: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv4-
EN.pdf 26 Nov 2009 
371
 See Disagreement no. 001/18-11-2008-ECCC/PTC, para. 45 available at:  
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/425/Public_redacted_version_-
_Considerations_of_the_PTC_regarding_the_Disagreement_between_the_Co-
Prosecutors_pursuant_to_Internal_Rule_71_%28English%29.pdf , 19 April 2010 
79 
 
Council of Magistracy. This in turn ensures at least some political interference in the said 
body.
372
 The Council of Magistracy chooses the Cambodian judges for the ECCC.  Ultimately 
this means that Cambodian politics are not separated from the ECCC, but do de facto come in 
contact with the mixed tribunal.  
But judges that might have been bribed or corrupt prior to the ECCC might have freed 
themselves from this pattern. They were trained prior to the opening of the tribunal. However, 
I question if one can truly free oneself from prior influences, possibly influences during long 
periods of time. And even if that is possible, I question whether judges that still have 
connections to politicians can make independent and objective decisions knowing that 
powerful politicians might oppose them. But even so, judges themselves might have political 
opinions. It is not uncommon that judges are politically active, or that they have political 
opinions. And political opinions are intertwined with values. The question is then, if such a 
question is on the stand, whether a judge can disconnect oneself from its own opinion. If one 
ponders that this is questionable even in democratic states, one realizes that is actually 
possible if not probable in Cambodia which has a tradition of corruption and impunity. And 
so, if the judges are not able disconnect themselves from politics, how can they make 
decisions separated from politics? And if the decisions are not separated from politics, how 
can independence and fairness be guaranteed? And if independence and fairness cannot be 
guaranteed, how can this promote the notion of accountability and change the culture of 
impunity? These questions remain debated.  
Political questions aside, corruption remains a fact and so does the poor economic 
situation in the country. The judges‘ low salaries make way for an acceptance of bribery, and 
that together with a culture that does not necessarily respect law very much continues to leave 
a door open for a sustainment of corruption, even in the ECCC.  
Conclusively, the answer to the question whether and how the ECCC is affected by 
the Cambodian hybrid system might be given away by the question itself. It is a hybrid 
system. It has dual identities, one being an internalized traditional one, the other being a 
democratic one, introduced by the international community and holding the ECCC within it. 
The people do not believe in the norm of democracy yet. Hence, even if there is consensus on 
what their community should look like, even if there is a constitution stipulating these norms, 
they are not yet convinced that these ideas govern the country. And they are right, because 
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despite the rules of law, practices of patronage and corruption tell us otherwise. The ideas 
themselves do not change reality, internalization and socialization is required. Ergo, 
democratic values and international standards of justice have not yet become the norm in 
Cambodia because they are not yet practiced. However, if the ECCC holds its practices to 
international standards of justice, these norms might eventually become reality in Cambodia.  
Finally, my thoughts are that if corruption and political interference affect the ECCC‘s 
practices, it might lead to a disbelief in other international tribunals in the future. The 
Nuremberg Trials set the base for successful international trials.
373
 ICTY is a successful 
example of an international tribunal. It established a trust for such tribunals in the 
international community and showed that even government officials and leaders held 
responsible for their actions. The ECCC is a first example of a mixed tribunal. It could set 
precedence. A failure might affect the possibility for mixed tribunals in the future and in 
extension, international ones. If the tribunal ultimately is influenced by Cambodia‘s corrupt 
politics, the notion of a neutral mechanism for adjudicating atrocities against human kind 
might get lost. It might cause public outrage, and disappointment. And the last thing we need 
in a world full of conflicts is the notion that not even the international tribunals that are 
supposed to safeguard human rights are failing them as well as the people that have lived 
through these evils.  
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